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STRATEGY ON U.S. GOVERNMENT HUSBANDING SERVICE 
PROVIDER (HSP) PRICES 
ABSTRACT 
 In 2016, the U.S. Navy transitioned from Single Award Contract (SAC) to 
Multiple-Award Contract (MAC) Indefinite-Delivery–Indefinite-Quantity (IDIQ) 
husbanding service contracts. Recent port services pricing data suggests that some 
services or ports may cost more under a MAC compared to a SAC. The objective of this 
study is to identify whether there is a statistically significant difference in price for U.S. 
Navy husbanding port services and to estimate the relationship of price between these 
two competitive husbanding service provider (HSP) contracting strategies. A price 
comparison between the contract types was performed using three fixed-effects 
regression models. The results of the models showed a statistically significant difference 
in price between SAC and MAC. The model estimated that for a given port and given 
ship type, the average price for HSP services was less for a MAC than for a SAC. 
Additionally, the effect of the MAC on price changes based on the port and service 
category. However, the effect of contract strategy on price could be marginally under- or 
overstated based on the immeasurable effects of nonmonetary qualitative factors. Further 
research will be required to understand the true cost–benefit of MACs and the overall 
best value to the government. 
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In a fiscally challenging environment filled with rising global competition, U.S. 
defense leaders require definitive, objective, and comprehensive information to guide 
strategic decision-making and maximize the available resources in support of the 
warfighter and promote mission success. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) discusses 
“Reform[ing] the [Defense] Department for Greater Performance and Affordability,” 
which includes “budget discipline and affordability to achieve solvency” (DoD, 2018).  In 
particular, the NDS advises defense leaders to “drive greater efficiency in procurement of 
materiel and services while pursuing opportunities to consolidate and streamline contracts 
in areas such as logistics, information technology, and support services” (DoD, 2018). As 
part of the reform effort, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) established 
strategic priorities in the area of contract management, adopting a Multiple Award Contract 
(MAC) strategy in order to increase the amount of competition for Husbanding Service 
Provider (HSP) contracts. Theoretically, the effect of increased competition from the MAC 
would decrease costs to the government or provide greater value. 
The HSP MAC phase-replaced the Single Award Contract (SAC) across all regions 
starting in 2016. Initially, the average cost of husbanding services per day decreased 
following the implementation of the HSP MAC, but the average cost unexpectedly 
increased in fiscal year 2019, raising the question of the effect of the MAC on price. The 
objective of this study is to determine if the prices for husbanding port services under a 
SAC and MAC are statistically different and estimate the effect of the MAC on price. This 
study conducts a quantitative analysis of the measurable effects of the MAC strategy on 
price within the HSP program.  
To investigate our research question, a port-service price comparison between 
contract types was performed using three fixed-effects regression models, which provide 
an estimate of the effect of the MAC on price while holding constant other factors that 
could confound this effect. This study used pricing data from HS Portal, an online database 
of husbanding service data which recorded HSP services data over a three-year period. The 
panel data provided contract Exhibit Line Item Number (ELIN) prices, including quantity, 
xviii 
ship type, unit of issue, and port location. A four-step process was used to remove 
erroneous data, which included removing observations with missing data elements, 
extreme values, miscellaneous ELINs and excluding ports not listed on the original base 
contract. We then developed three different fixed-effects linear regression models through 
an iterative trial-and-error process. As a result of our model development process, we chose 
not to include the effect of inflation due to quasi-omitted variable bias. Other variables 
were not included in the model because these variables were either not measurable or did 
not have sufficient data available (e.g., market anomalies such as special events, the 
differences in Statement of Work/Performance Work Statement between the contracts, and 
various other non-price factors). After completing the model development process, each 
regression model accounted for competition, contractor’s pricing strategy, exchange rates, 
order quantity, ship category, service category, and port.  
Results from the primary regression model (model 1) showed that, using a 95% 
confidence interval, the MAC reduced prices for port services by 14.8% to 20.6% using 
our preferred method. Using the port-specific analysis (model 2) and service-specific 
analysis (model 3), we found a preponderance of the statistically significant coefficient 
estimates were negative, representing a decrease in price for multiple award contracts. 
However, there was a large variation in price differences between single award and 
multiple award contracts based on the type of service category or the assigned port. 
We used the results of the three models to conclude that the MAC effect decreased 
the average price for services in aggregate across all ports and service categories, but 
assessing the overall net benefit of the MAC requires additional data collection because 
there are other non-price factors that could add value for the government. Additional data 
sources could include measuring and incorporating non-price factors into the model, such 
as logistics lead time, dynamic force employment, operational security, and administrative 
workload. We provide a list of additional measurable data elements that would improve 
future research and may capture the true effect of competition internal to the MAC. 
Furthermore, we recommend that NAVSUP continue to use and execute the MAC on a 
global scale as the primary contracting mechanism for competing HSP services. We also 
xix 
suggest that other services and agencies use this study as a benchmark for adopting a MAC 
strategy into their organizations.  
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Husbanding port services provide Navy ships with a wide range of commercial 
logistics and resupply services in various ports around the world. These services are 
currently contracted through the federal acquisitions process using Multiple Award 
Contracts (MAC) under an Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) base contract. 
Prior to the introduction of the MAC strategy, husbanding service provider (HSP) contracts 
were competed using a Single Award Contract (SAC), by which only a single offeror was 
awarded the base contract for a specified region. The MAC concept was introduced to 
maximize competition, leading to increased value or reduced prices for the Navy. 
A. PURPOSE 
The price per port visit is one metric the Navy uses to measure the effectiveness of 
MAC implementation. Following the phased implementation of MAC, the Navy 
recognized a reduction in costs per port visit from 2016 through 2018. However, recent 
pricing data indicates a recognizable increase in costs per port visit for 2019, which 
presents the possibility that some services or ports may cost more under a MAC compared 
to SAC. (See Figure 1.) This unexpected trend has prompted key stakeholders, such as 
Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) and type commanders, to inquire about the 
effect of the MAC strategy on the HSP contract prices and validate the concept that MACs 
reduce prices. Although the Navy has been exclusively executing MAC IDIQ contracts for 
husbanding services over the last three years, there has been no formal report or study 
conducted to document the effects of the change to MAC on port visit prices. To this end, 
the following study compares SAC and MAC strategies for Navy HSP services and 
explains the price effects of the MAC implementation using an individual fixed-effects 
regression model. Additionally, this study investigates the MAC effects of specific ports 
and specific types of services to explain the differences in prices. Ultimately, this study 
objectively examines the quantitative factor of price and presents qualitative factors such 
as administrative workload and combat effectiveness for senior leadership to consider 
2 
when making net-benefit assessments of the contracting strategies and for informing future 
contracting policy. 
 
Figure 1. Average Cost/Day and Total Cost by FY 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
According to Federal Acquisition Regulation (F.A.R.) 16.504, the government 
must, “to the maximum extent practicable, give preference to making multiple awards of 
indefinite-quantity contracts” (F.A.R 16.504, 2019). The Navy recognized a gap in the 
competitive strategy of the HSP contracts and an opportunity to shift from a SAC to a MAC 
strategy during the adoption of Off-Ship Bill Pay (OSBP). To increase competition among 
husbanding service contracts, the Navy began to implement use of MACs in 2016, which 
incorporated additional competition at the task order-level (T. Kunish, NAVSUP N72 
Contracting Directorate, Fleet Support, email to authors, April 7, 2020). The reformed HSP 
policy was intended to maximize the competitive environment, in accordance with 
statutory and regulatory requirements, and reduce costs for the government. However, the 
mere fact that greater competition is introduced into the contracting strategy is not evidence 
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or proof that the contracting strategy is superior for providing the government the lowest 
price or increased purchasing power. Although competition has proven to drive innovation 
and reduce costs to the buyer, there is no objective research to suggest that implementation 
of a MAC strategy will always reduce prices for the HSP program. 
The F.A.R. 16.504 states that MAC should not be used if knowledge of the market 
shows that single award has more favorable conditions. Highly volatile markets increase 
prices for port services over time and can aggravate costs to the government. Under a SAC, 
the prices established during the contract award are fixed for the entirety of the performance 
period. In a SAC domain, the contractor is bound by the price ceiling, regardless of any 
fluctuations in the true market value of the services over time. In contrast, in a MAC 
situation, the prices may be a more accurate representation of the true market value of a 
particular service because the prices will likely change based on the current market 
conditions. A SAC does not respond to changes in the market because prices are fixed for 
the contract’s period of performance. Therefore, the prices are less likely to change under 
a SAC but more likely to change under a MAC. These finely divided differences between 
both contract strategies illustrates the dynamic role of competition and reinforces the 
possibility that prices could increase or decrease under a MAC strategy. Our research 
explores the price differences between the SAC and MAC to determine if there is a 
significant difference in prices for HSP services and estimate the effects of contract strategy 
on price. Our primary research questions are: 
• Are the average prices for services significantly different between SAC 
and MAC? 
• What is the estimated effect of the MAC on price? 
• Does the effect of the MAC on price change based on the type of service 
or port location? 
C. BACKGROUND 
The Navy routinely conducts port visits around the world and in fiscal year 2019 
the Navy spent more than $139.6 million for husbanding services (see Figure 1). When a 
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Navy ship enters a non-Navy port to conduct port visit operations, the ship requires 
commercial husbanding services. Depending on the contract region, there are roughly 
480 line items of services available on the base contract; common services include harbor 
piloting, van rentals, phone rentals, waste removal, and force protection (NAVSUP, n.d.). 
These services are placed on contract and awarded to an HSP, a commercial vendor who 
has access to local resources and experience with providing port services to ships visiting 
in a specified region. Due to constantly changing schedules and requirements, the Navy 
utilizes an IDIQ firm-fixed price contract for all HSP contracts. Understanding the effects 
of contract strategy on pricing requires a clear understanding of IDIQ contracts, the 
dynamic role of competition in federal acquisitions, and the changes resulting from the 
2014 Naval Audit Service’s findings and recommendations.  
1. Indefinite-Delivery–Indefinite-Quantity Contracts 
The F.A.R. 16.504 defines “indefinite-delivery contracts” as providing “an 
indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of supplies or services during a fixed period.” In a 
2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on federal acquisitions, William 
Woods explained that indefinite-delivery contracts are awarded “when the government 
does not know at the time of award the exact times and/or quantities of future deliveries” 
(Woods, 2018a, p. 1). These types of contracts are used when the government is unable to 
provide a determination, above a specified minimum, of quantities of services or specific 
time period needed.  
There are three types of indefinite-delivery contracts accepted in federal 
acquisitions, but the most widely used type of contract is IDIQ. According to the GAO’s 
2017 report regarding use of indefinite contracts, the federal government obligates more 
than $130 billion on IDIQ contracts every year, with the Department of Defense (DoD) 
accounting for $88.4 billion of those obligations (Woods, 2017). The Fiscal Year 2020 
President’s Budget requested $761.8 billion in defense discretionary spending, meaning 
that based on the GAO estimate, roughly 11% of the overall discretionary budget would be 
obligated using indefinite-delivery contracts (White House, 2019). These figures convey 
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the scale and magnitude of federal acquisition use of indefinite-delivery contracts and 
illustrate the importance of this contracting strategy for each agency and military service.  
An IDIQ contract serves as the base-award contract, providing a preapproved set 
of terms and conditions that typically include pricing for products or services. An IDIQ 
contract is special because the base-award contract can be solicited as either a SAC or 
MAC. A SAC IDIQ contract signifies that a single contractor will be awarded all task 
orders during the period of performance. A MAC IDIQ contract signifies that multiple 
contractors will be selected from the competitive range, and task orders will be competed 
among the down-selected offerors. The most obvious difference between SAC and MAC 
IDIQ contracts is the role of competition. 
2. Role of Competition 
The role of competition within federal acquisition policy has been defined in 
various federal statutes and defense regulations. The Code of Federal Regulations states 
that “all procurement transactions shall be conducted in a manner to provide, to the 
maximum extent practical, open and free competition” (Competition, 2010). Similarly, the 
United States Code requires maximizing the competitive elements of a solicitation by 
ensuring “full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures” and by 
mandating the use of the “competitive procedure or combination of competitive procedures 
that [are] best suited under the circumstances of the procurement” (Competition 
requirements, 2010). The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 mandates the use of 
competitive procedures for federal acquisition of supplies and services and requires 
agencies to “obtain full and open competition” (Competition requirements, 2010). 
According to Title 41 of USC, the phrase “full and open competition” implies that “all 
responsible sources are permitted to compete … [and that] responsible sources are 
permitted to submit sealed bids or competitive proposals on the procurement.” Although 
the definition of terms and regulations for competition span across a wide range of 
references, all definitions support the argument for increasing competition in federal 
acquisitions.  
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In 2013, the GAO recognized an increase in sole-source contracts and a reduction 
in competitive contracts across all DoD acquisitions (Courts, 2013). As a result of the 
trends, the GAO recommended that federal agencies “develop guidance that could enable 
DoD components … to increase competition for the same goods and services” (Courts, 
2013, p. 28). The DoD concurred with these findings and mandated that all the department 
services, notably the Department of the Navy, increase competition for goods and services 
in the future (Courts, 2013). Following these recommendations, the 2018 GAO report 
found that acquisition competition rates within the DoD had continued to decline from 
2013 through 2017, with many prospective companies citing the complexity of the DoD 
acquisition process as a barrier (Woods, 2018b). 
The theory behind increasing competition is to provide the government with greater 
purchasing power by encouraging sellers to maximize efficiency of resources. Purchasing 
power, also known as buying power, refers to the government’s ability to buy more goods, 
services, or value with the same amount of money. Former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) Frank Kendall released the Better Buying 
Power acquisition reform policy to encourage smarter defense spending and increase the 
government’s purchasing power (Kendall, 2015). One of the core tenets of the Better 
Buying Power policy is to “promote effective competition” (Kendall, 2015, p. 23), which 
is the best practice to improve decision-making and reduce costs without compromising 
defense capability. Creating a competitive environment is intended to incentivize 
contractors to reduce expenses, encourage innovation, promote efficiency, and increase 
performance to strengthen the quality of services. The objective of the initiative is intended 
to “create and maintain competitive environments, improve DoD outreach for technology 
and products from global markets, [and] increase small business participation, including 
more effective use of market research” (Kendall, 2015, attachment 1). The release of the 
Better Buying Power triggered the Defense Department to adopt more competitive 
contracting strategies and reform acquisition processes to improve purchasing power. An 
example of an agency taking actions consistent with the Better Buying Power initiative 
occurred when the NAVSUP contracting office, with concurrence from the fleet HSP 
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program managers, transitioned away from the SAC strategy and instead adopted a MAC 
strategy for HSP contracts.  
3. HSP Program Changes 
The HSP program underwent a Secretary of the Navy–mandated audit in 2014 by 
the Naval Audit Services following the discovery of procurement fraud between Navy 
officials and the Glenn Defense Marine Asia company. To address the internal control 
vulnerabilities and areas for improvement identified during the audit, the Navy 
implemented OSBP. This new process expanded the role and presence of Contracting 
Officer Representatives (CORs) within the fleet, providing greater surveillance of 
contractor services, improved quality control for payments, and better tracking of HSP 
costs. 
Although the audit did not address the contracting strategy as a weakness or an area 
needing improvement, the shift from SAC to MAC complemented the implementation of 
OSBP by reducing the potential for fraudulent activity within the HSP program and 
improving pricing data for the contracting office. These changes enabled a rich database of 
pricing activity that is now being recorded in an online database called Husbanding Service 
(HS) Portal, formerly LogSSR, which represents the source of pricing data used for this 
study. Since the 2014 Naval Audit Service report did not address the HSP contracting 
strategy, the decision to change from a SAC- to MAC-type IDIQ contract was independent 
from the implementation of the OSBP process and instead was predominantly influenced 
by the Navy-wide acquisition reform rather than auditability. 
D. CURRENT ISSUES IDENTIFIED 
Although many DoD agencies have responded to the Better Buying Power 
initiative, there is a lack of evidence to show the specific effects of the MAC strategy on 
contractor’s prices within the Navy’s HSP program. Additionally, there has been no 
analysis to determine if the MAC effect on price is greater or less in certain ports or certain 
categories of services. Due to a vacuum of research in the field of HSP IDIQ SACs and 
MACs, the true cost of the MAC strategy, to include non-price factors, is still not fully 
understood. The goal of this study is to explore the effects of the MAC strategy on 
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husbanding service prices. To accomplish this goal, we designed a regression model to 
estimate the effect a MAC has on price and determine if the effect on price changes based 
on the port or type of service. 
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This study aims to compare prices of servicers between SAC and MAC. All 
quantitative pricing data for the analysis was gathered from the HS Portal website. The 
data used in this analysis are based on prices for husbanding services paid by the 
government, dates indicating the date services were rendered, quantity of services 
provided, contract numbers corresponding to either SAC or MAC, and descriptions of the 
services provided. The data used in this study are unclassified but includes business 
sensitive information, such as pricing data of a specific contractor for a specific service. 
The pricing data was used to obtain results but the specific prices for an individual 
contractor is not presented in this report in order to protect the pricing strategy of private 
businesses. Therefore, this study will not list any specific contractor’s names or prices for 
task order award and the results do not provide any sensitive or restricted information about 
the contractors. The information provided in this analysis is public knowledge and does 
not restrict dissemination of our findings or results. 
This study does not evaluate policies or procedures, and it is not the intention of 
this study to be the single source of information to determine the appropriate contract 
strategy for the HSP program. Non-price factors, such as quality or performance, cannot 
be fully isolated from cost, and therefore non-price factors must be considered to provide 
a complete net assessment. This study does not monetize or provide a cost–benefit analysis 
of the non-price factors.  
This study’s statistical model is designed to explain the relationship between price 
and contract method—specific to the Navy’s HSP program—and provides consideration 
for non-price factors to arm decision-makers with additional information when developing 
future acquisition strategies.  
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F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows: Chapter II presents an 
assessment of literature relevant to the purpose of the study. Chapter III reviews the 
contracting process for both SAC and MAC IDIQ contracts and describes the guiding 
regulations that govern the contracting process. Chapter IV describes the data and 
methodology used to conduct the analysis. Chapter V provides the analysis and 
interpretation of our results for various models. Lastly, Chapter VI ends with the 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Assessing the literature related to comparing SAC and MAC requires drawing on a 
number of different materials: federally funded studies related to use of IDIQ contracts 
throughout the Department of Defense, other Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) MBA 
professional reports related to HSP, and numerous academic articles related to the 
measurement of qualitative factors that influence decision-making. Due to the recent shift 
from SAC to MAC for HSP contracts and the continuous maturation of the HSP landscape, 
there has been no research on whether the MAC, with a competitive market, lowers costs 
to the government. However, literature was reviewed to identify results from prior studies 
that compared trends between SAC and MAC in non-HSP environments and from other 
studies that involved assessing types of HSP contracts prior to the introduction of the  
MAC concept.  
A. TRENDS IN THE USE OF MACS  
The GAO has conducted research to track financial obligation between SAC and 
MAC to identify any trends across defense agencies over time. The GAO report Defense 
Contracting: Use by the Department of Defense of Indefinite-Delivery Contracts from 
Fiscal Years 2015 through 2017 examined the amount of federal outlays across the DoD 
toward SAC and MAC IDIQ contracts from 2011 to 2015. The study showed that the 
percentage of federal outlays that were contractually obligated using IDIQ contracts 
increased over the five-year period, but that the majority of the IDIQ contracts were 
competed as a single-award rather than a multiple-award contract (Woods, 2018a). This 
report illustrates that the execution of IDIQ contracts has received congressional-level 
attention and validates the relevance for studying types of IDIQ-service contracts across 
the NAVSUP enterprise.  
Unfortunately, this study was performed at the agency level and used a wide 
aperture of sampling, including IDIQ contracts from various military services and other 
federal organizations, without controlling for any differences between these organizations. 
Additionally, the various contracts sampled in the analysis executed funds from various 
12 
types of appropriation categories, which would not provide an accurate comparison 
between contract types. For example, the study combined service contracts for base 
operations, like operations and maintenance for roofing repairs, with services for major 
weapon systems, like research and development for detecting malware and cybersecurity 
threats (Woods, 2018a). Finally, the analysis of the IDIQ contracts included sole-source, 
noncompetitive environments, which greatly overestimated the effects of pricing on 
contract strategy.  
Although this report provides valuable insight on the difference in the overall 
amount of federal spending between single-award and multiple-award IDIQ contracts 
across the DoD, it was not intended to explain the relationship between price and contract 
strategy. The study did not use modeling or analysis to estimate any of the effects between 
single- and multiple-award IDIQ contracts and the prices for services. Therefore, this report 
adds value for the purpose of our research by identifying an increased use of IDIQ contracts 
across the defense organizations and a cultural shift toward the use of MACs, furthering a 
need to better understand the true effects of federal spending between SAC and MAC. 
However, the findings of this report do not support or challenge any of the results from our 
analysis because there was no direct comparison to government spending between SAC 
and MAC. 
B. HSP RESEARCH 
The most recent NPS study related to comparing benefits of different types of HSP 
contracts was conducted in 2007 by Gundemir et al. Their study conducted a comparative 
analysis of various contracting methods and strategies at the base-contract and task-order 
level. The study also provided models for forecasting port visit costs under a SAC strategy 
and conducted an analysis of costs between 2003 and 2004 using eight ports located in 
Fifth Fleet area of operation. The study revealed that the most preferred type of contract 
for HSP services depends largely on the trade-offs between the risk of uncertainty in the 
projected number of ports per year and the trade-off with the cost of flexibility.  
Although the work of Gundemir et al. (2007) provides some useful information 
about the SAC IDIQ contract strategy, the scope of their analysis was based on outdated 
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processes and a smaller sample size (sample size only included 12 services from 8 different 
ports) for forecasting future port service costs. An example of an outdated process was the 
billing procedures and administrative burden for processing payments during 2007, which 
has been streamlined and is now processed electronically through an online system called 
Wide Area Work Flow. Moreover, the report did not make any assessment of the MAC 
strategy because the strategy was still underutilized and not fully developed at the time of 
the study, making the analysis ineffective for comparison to the legacy SAC strategy. 
Because the environment has changed significantly over the last decade, this study does 
not provide significant value for future decision-making. However, the study is worthwhile 
because the report offers qualitative performance measures for consideration when 
developing the task-order and base-contract evaluation criteria. Additionally, much of the 
standardization effort that has been adopted by NAVSUP policy were consistent with the 
direction and recommendation of this report. Furthermore, consistent with the 
recommendation for standardization, NAVSUP is currently taking action to explore the 
potential for expanding contracting strategies at a global level across all fleets by forming 
a global MAC; implementation of this policy will have effects and outcomes that have not 
been objectively studied.  
C. MAC FOR MAINTENANCE AVAILABILITIES 
An NPS thesis published in 2015 by Matthew Duncan and Richard Hartl examined 
the impact of the Multiple-Award Contract–Multiple-Order (MAC-MO) contract strategy, 
relative to a SAC, on Navy surface maintenance periods. Their study compared this pilot-
program strategy, which is now fully implemented and executed, with previous contracting 
strategies used in the procurement of maintenance contacts to determine efficiency and 
effectiveness of the contracting strategy. The study utilized the following existing 
maintenance contracts metrics:  
1. Cost growth. Calculated by dividing the total dollar value of the 
contractual change by the total dollar value of the contract.  
2. On-time award. Calculated by subtracting the actual award date from the 
estimated award date. 
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3. On-time completion. Calculated by dividing the number of availabilities 
completed on time by the total number of maintenance availabilities in 
that period.  
The study determined that the MAC-MO was more effective at controlling growth and new 
work costs, but the effectiveness on other metrics were inconclusive in the comparison of 
strategies. 
The primary limitation of this study was the limited data for MAC-MO contract 
availability. Due to the implementation of MAC-MO as a pilot program and the duration 
of maintenance availabilities, the data contained only five maintenance periods for 
comparing contracting strategies. A direct comparison between this MAC-MO study and 
our HSP study is not possible due to inherent differences and additional factors within the 
maintenance process. One inherent difference includes the types of services offered 
between maintenance contracts and HSP contracts; HSP services are services exclusively 
while the maintenance services include some direct material costs for repairs. The technical 
requirements for maintenance work vary greatly and have a much larger percentage of 
labor requirements. Additionally, the structure of the contracts is drastically different; 
maintenance contracts tend to be more complex, with incentive fees and extensive work 
packages, compared to HSP contracts, which are more simplex in nature and the period of 
performance for the task orders are relatively shorter in comparison. During the pilot 
program implementing MAC-MO, there were also several changes implemented beyond 
the increased competition factor. Included within the contract was a contracted third-party 
planner used for planning and analysis of the maintenance availabilities, as well as a change 
in the incentive structure from previous strategies. Due to these additional factors beyond 
a change in competition, a direct comparison between HSP and maintenance procurement 
of potential cost reduction using a MAC strategy is not possible. The study did not examine 
the total cost of procurement and instead used the metric for cost of growth and new work 
as measures of effectiveness rather than examining the reduction of prices. 
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D. QUALITATIVE 
No data are currently recorded for Navy HSP qualitative information or 
standardized system for measuring the effectiveness of HSP contracts is in place. Within 
“Multiple Objective Decision-Making,” Wall and Mackenzie (2015) outlined the basis of 
establishing such a system from the selection of relevant objectives and relative importance 
between price and effectiveness. With these models, decision-makers are forced to quantify 
the objectives which directly relate to the method of data collection and enable data-driven 
decisions (Wall & Mackenzie, 2015). 
Within “Multi-criteria Decision-Making Based on Trust and Reputation in Supply 
Chain,” Chang et al. specifically addressed supply-chain relationships between suppliers 
and customers of raw materials using a distribution system. The article is specific to a 
manufacturing supply chain rather than a service supply framework. The establishment of 
a type of reputation model in partnership with the relevant objective models provides a 
consistent standardized method for the evaluation of contractors regardless of location 
(Chang et al, 2014). 
E. SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
The current available literature is useful for understanding the broader scope of the 
Navy’s husbanding service process and the competitive sourcing strategies used for single- 
and multiple-award IDIQ contracts. However, there is a complete gap across the 
contracting research for analyzing quantitative measures that explain the effects of IDIQ 
contract types on price. This research offers insight into the field of defense contract 
management and provides an initial data point for further studies to consider. Our research 
contributes a model that future analysts can use to better explain the relationship between 
contract strategy and price to scrutinize or substantiate future claims that greater 
competition is less costly.  
  
16 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
17 
III. CONTRACTING PROCESS OVERVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION 
The acquisition procedure for NAVSUP husbanding services has developed 
dramatically since the implementation of OSBP in 2015, but the process for awarding an 
HSP contract has remained fundamentally unchanged. To address the process for awarding 
a contract as it applies to HSP and for understanding the methodology of our analysis, this 
chapter explains the basic phases and milestones for NAVSUP HSP contracting, including 
the process for awarding the base contract and issuing a task order. Each process 
description identifies the differences between the SAC and MAC, which is essential for 
understanding the regression analysis. Additionally, the latter portion of this chapter 
describes potential effects of contract elements on contract prices and non-price contract 
variables, which serves as the basis for formulating our theory.  
A. BASE CONTRACT AWARD PROCESS  
A base contract performs like a catalog, allowing the contracting office to order 
services from a predetermined list. The base contract consists of general terms and 
conditions with ordering procedures and various contract clauses required by the F.A.R. 
The base contract consists of three phases: pre-award, award, and post-award. Each phase 
of the contract life cycle is further divided into the following major milestones: acquisition 
planning, solicitation, submission of proposals, evaluation of proposals, award of the base 
contract, contract execution, contract administration, and contract closeout (NMCA, 2019). 
Figure 2 provides a visual for understanding the relationship between these milestones 
relative to the overall contracting process.  
  
18 
Figure 2. Diagram of Contract Process Overview 
Both SACs and MACs follow the same path through these phases and milestones 
of a contract but use different competitive strategies and processes for executing each 
milestone. The following sections describe each contracting milestone for the base 
contract, highlighting differences between the SAC and MAC. 
1. Acquisition Planning  
Early in the acquisition process, key stakeholders of the HSP program develop an 
acquisition plan. Contained in the acquisition plan is the Source Selection Plan (SSP), 
which acts as the guide for conducting an evaluation and analysis of the contractor’s 
proposals. The SSP includes key decisions approved by the fleet customer that impact the 
acquisition, such as the contract evaluation criteria and contract type (i.e., the decision to 
use a SAC or MAC). HSP contracting follows F.A.R. Part 15:  
An agency can obtain best value in negotiated acquisitions by using any one 
or a combination of source selection approaches. In different types of 
acquisitions, the relative importance of cost or price may vary. For example, 
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in acquisitions where the requirement is clearly definable and the risk of 
unsuccessful contract performance is minimal, cost or price may play a 
dominant role in source selection. The less definitive the requirement, the 
more development work required, or the greater the performance risk, the 
more technical or past performance considerations may play a dominant 
role in source selection.  
Since port services are clearly definable, with minimal risk of unsuccessful performance, 
the source selection approach historically used prior to 2015 for awarding HSP base 
contracts was Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA). Under LPTA, contracts are 
awarded based on the lowest-priced offer that meets the minimum technical requirements 
of a port visit. However, following the implementation of OSBP in 2015, the Navy started 
to favor a trade-off source selection approach, which awards contracts to the offeror that 
represents the best overall value to the government based on a set of graded evaluation 
criteria. The decision authority and evaluation boards, comprised of the source selection 
team, are charged with determining the best source selection approach. F.A.R. 15.3, 
“Source Selection,” outlines the procedures for establishing a source selection team, 
consisting of multiple acquisition disciplines (e.g., finance, engineering, legal) to ensure a 
comprehensive evaluation of offers.  
2. Solicitation 
After completing the acquisition plan, the contracting office generates a 
solicitation, or request for proposal (RFP), specifying the region’s requirements for HSP 
services. This solicitation expresses the government’s intentions to seek public offers for 
providing an indefinite delivery of HSP services. The solicitation contains the evaluation 
criteria identified in the source selection plan, which will be weighted higher than, lower 
than, or equal to price. The key difference between a SAC and MAC throughout the 
solicitation process is that a MAC RFP will state the government’s intention to award the 
base contract to multiple contractors.  
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3. Contractor’s Submission of Proposals 
The prospective contractors are given time to review the solicitation material, the 
contract clauses, and the base contract terms and conditions. At this point, the prospective 
contractors will prepare and submit their proposals to the contracting office with all 
required documentation, including pricing data, consistent with the instructions provided 
in the solicitation. There are no differences between the SAC and MAC during this 
milestone from the government’s perspective.  
4. Evaluation of Proposals and Award of Base Contract 
The evaluation of proposals begins when the solicitation period is complete and the 
prospective contractors have submitted their proposals. Consistent with the source 
selection plan, each evaluation criterion will be weighted differently depending on the 
government’s intentions to award the base contract under a SAC or MAC. In accordance 
with the acquisition plan, the source selection team rates each proposal using the criteria 
published during the solicitation in order to determine the awardee(s) of the base contract. 
In a SAC, only one contractor will be awarded a base contract, while MACs award base 
contracts to multiple contractors. After awarding the base contract(s), contract execution 
begins, allowing ships to utilize the contract(s) to conduct port visits.  
5. Execution, Administration, and Closeout  
Contract execution takes place after the base contract is awarded. This milestone 
marks the beginning of the task order process where individual orders are issued against 
the base contract. Task orders are discussed in detail in the next section. During contract 
execution, the contracting office and contractor(s) maintain the contract through 
administration, which consists of periodic reviews of the performance of contractors and 
ensures completion of all applicable files and paperwork. Finally, at the end of the contract, 
the contracting office will administratively close out the contract in accordance with F.A.R. 
4.804-5. Contract closeout consists of closing the contracting file after all balances are paid 
and all obligations are satisfied. Closeouts do not have any bearing on the results of this 
project and will not be discussed further.  
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Table 1 summarizes the major events in awarding a SAC or MAC HSP IDIQ base 
contract. The table illustrates the path the base contract award process uses for both the 
SAC and MAC. However, as previously stated, due to the competition differences between 
SACs and MACs, the process differences begin at the contract execution phase with issuing 
the task orders. 
Table 1. Summary of HSP IDIQ Contract Phases 
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Solicitation Contracting office submits a Request for Proposal (RFP). 
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The period of performance begins. Naval 
ships request services resulting in individual 
task orders issued against the base contract. 
(For the process, see Figure 2.) 
Contract administration 
The cognizant Contracting Officer 
Representative (COR) monitors the 
contractor’s performance to ensure proper 
contract execution. A contractor evaluation is 
conducted periodically by the COR. 
Contract Closeout 
 
After the period of performance ends, the 





B. TASK ORDER AWARD PROCESS (CONTRACT EXECUTION) 
The task order process is embedded within the post-award phase and occurs 
concurrently with the execution milestone of the base contract. Task orders contain the 
requirements for husbanding services, which are determined by naval vessels that will be 
conducting each port visit. Task orders are used to satisfy the requirements for an individual 
ship or, depending on the circumstances, multiple ships for multiple port visits. All task 
orders retain the same terms and conditions of the base contract, regardless of whether it is 
a SAC or MAC.  
The key difference between a SAC and MAC is the effect of competition during 
the task order process, which is clearly identifiable and consequential to price. During this 
process, the contracting office will initiate individual orders, known as task orders, citing 
the base contract as the legal authority. Issuing a task order using a SAC is straightforward: 
all work is directed to the single awardee in accordance with the fixed-price rates stated in 
the base contract. The contracting office sends the list of requirements to the contractor, 
who in response submits a Port Cost Estimate (PCE). The PCE provides the estimated cost 
for each service requested by the contracting office; this cost should match the negotiated 
base contract price analysis. The contracting office verifies the accuracy of the PCE with 
the base contract and issues the task order through a bilateral agreement, in which both 
parties agree to fulfill their side of the agreement. The SAC task orders are issued with no 
additional competition; therefore, no further evaluation criteria are required. If there is a 
requirement that is not listed in the base contract, known as an unpriced line item, the 
contractor can propose a price they deem reasonable. The contracting office will negotiate 
unpriced line items to obtain a fair and reasonable price prior to issuing the task order.  
The task order process for the MAC differs significantly and is more complex 
because an additional stage of competitive evaluation occurs among potential awardees. 
When the requirements are identified under a MAC, the contracting office identifies the 
appropriate evaluation criteria for the task order award. These evaluation criteria are based 




The list of evaluation criteria provided by NAVSUP standard operating procedures include 
lowest price, LPTA, and past performance trade-off. Additionally, the HS Portal provides 
the port visit checklist, Quality Assurance (QA) reports, and other documentation to 
provide past performance information establishing confidence level and relevancy 
(NAVSUP, 2018). 
The evaluation criteria and requirements are submitted to the multiple base contract 
awardees using a Request for Task Order Proposal (RTOP). The task order evaluation 
criteria can be different for each RTOP. For example, the RTOP for a particular port visit 
can be evaluated on lowest price, but on the next RTOP for the same port, the contracting 
office can use trade-off. Additionally, the contracting office also has the option to include 
multiple evaluation criteria, allowing the RTOP to be evaluated based on both past 
performance and price.  
Another key difference with a MAC is the ability of a contracting office to bypass 
the RTOP process and unilaterally issue a task order to any awardee without competition. 
For example, NAVSUP contract solicitation number N68171-20-R-0001 states,  
Subject to F.A.R. 16.505 (b)(2), the Government has the right to issue a 
Task Order to a contractor within the ordering period and up to the contract 
maximum, and the contractor is obligated to perform the Task Order, 
regardless of whether the contractor submitted an offer in response to an 
RTOP for the Task Order (see the clause “Indefinite Quantity,” F.A.R. 
52.216-22 of this contract and F.A.R. 16.504 (a)(1)), or whether the 
Government issued an RTOP for the Task Order (see, e.g., F.A.R. 
16.505(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2)). 
However, unlike the SAC sole awardee, the unilateral action would require the 
government to fair and reasonably compensate the selected awardee. Figure 3 is a side-by-




Figure 3. SAC and MAC Task Order Process Flow Charts 
Historically, MAC task orders have been evaluated based on lowest price. 
However, guidance from the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
for Fiscal Year 2019 encourages contracting officers to utilize evaluation factors other than 
LPTA. As a result, NAVSUP has begun utilizing trade-off evaluation criteria for task 
orders. Depending on the acquisition plan, MACs likely offer greater benefit to the U.S. 
government on the base contract price because additional criteria, such as those previously 
listed, can be used to evaluate offerors at the task order level. However, SACs place greater 
emphasis on non-price related criteria during the evaluation of the base contract because 
the selected offeror will be the only awardee issued at the task order level for the full 
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C. CONTRACT ELEMENTS AFFECTING CONTRACT PRICES 
Based on recent HSP contracts awarded during the last four years, this section 
identifies differences in NAVSUP HSP contract elements between SACs and MACs that 
affect overall contract cost. The relationships between these contract elements and price 
serve as the basis for our hypothesis.  
1. Number of Task Order Competitors 
The primary contract element that affects price differently between a SAC and 
MAC is the number of base contract awardees that are competing for the task order. In a 
SAC, there is only one vendor, which simplifies communication and issuing task orders. 
Therefore, the task order prices are more predictable because the prices are no longer being 
negotiated through a competitive process, and most of the prices are established in the 
original base contract. By comparison, the MAC task orders are competed among multiple 
contractors. The contracting office must determine the number of vendors that will receive 
a base contract award during the base contract source selection processes. Typically, the 
number of vendors awarded the base contract is determined by the contracting office. The 
MAC prices are more volatile due to the second level of competition. The greater number 
of base contract awardees competing for task orders probably has a negative correlation to 
price, decreasing overall cost to the government (Oliver, n.d.). 
2. Requirements Creep and Task Order Modifications  
Changes to the port visit requirements are common and expected due to the 
dynamic nature of operational forces and unpredictable environments. For example, a ship 
may request an additional daily van service for the entire length of the port visit after the 
task order has been issued. If the requirement change occurs after the task order is issued, 
as is the case in this example, then the contracting office must issue a modification to the 
awarded task order. If the modification is issued after the contractor has made financial 
commitments, then the government could be liable for any changes in cost to the contractor. 
To mitigate the potential for additional costs, the contracting office attempts to finalize the 
requirements with the ship as early as possible, but there is always a risk of additional cost 
when issuing a modification.  
26 
However, changes to the price for the services will be different depending on 
whether the modification is issued under a SAC or MAC. Modifications that occur under 
a SAC contract are less likely to increase the price of the services. Since the SAC has fixed-
price line items, the additional costs of the task order modification are equivalent to the 
prices listed in the original task order. For example, ordering a van rental for one day may 
cost $200 per day at a given port according to the base contract. Therefore, the cost of two 
days for one van rental is $400 ($200 × 2 days). If the ship changed the requirement to rent 
two vans for the same timeframe, then the cost will be $800 ($200 × 2 days × 2 vans). By 
contrast, the MAC is re-competed for every new task order. In the same scenario under a 
MAC, the contractor may propose an initial price of $200 per day for two days based on 
their RTOP proposal. However, if the ship requires an additional van, the contractor is 
entitled to charge up to the base contract maximum ceiling price. Unless otherwise 
specifically stated in the RTOP, the unit prices proposed in the RTOP offer are not binding 
and the contractor can change the price for the additional services. Additionally, the 
individual requirement change may be re-competed among all MAC awardees leading to 
multiple contractors providing services for one port visit. This leads to a situation where 
the contracting office must make a choice: negotiate the price and issue the modification 
to the existing task order or cancel the original task order and recompete the entire task 
order with the new requirements. Both options have the potential to increase costs to the 
government. Therefore, under a MAC, modifications as a result of increased requirements 
will likely have an additional (increasing) effect on prices because these additional 
requirements are not competed, whereas SAC is more likely to maintain the same unit price 
because priced line items are set in the base award.  
3. Coverage Area  
The MAC’s use of a coverage area (rather than a specified list of ports used in a 
SAC) may have a downward effect on price, decreasing overall cost to the government. An 
HSP contract specifies either by port name or geographical area of potential locations 
requiring contracted husbanding services. Any port that requires husbanding services 
outside the geographical region specified in the contract is considered out of scope.  
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In a SAC, specific port names are identified in the contract, meaning that any port 
outside the contract’s list of ports requires a modification agreed upon by all parties and 
must be negotiated into the contract, and these prices are not competed. As a result, the 
unpriced line items for the additional port location may have higher unit prices compared 
to the priced line items that were competed in the base award. 
For a MAC, rather than naming specific ports, the contract lists countries, including 
all ports within the country’s territorial waters. The inclusion of such a significant number 
of locations (which may include ports not yet built) means the contract awardees must 
consider providing services to all possible port locations within the coverage area, which 
will likely affect the proposal prices. Using a coverage area provides greater flexibility for 
the contracting office and, as a result, likely reduces the number of modifications for 
unpriced line items.  
4. Commerciality  
Unilateral changes are not a characteristic of a SAC or MAC, but NAVSUP HSP 
SACs have historically used commercial contract standards, while HSP MACs include 
noncommercial contract clauses. Noncommercial contract clauses provide the government 
with the authority to make changes to the contract without consent or agreement from the 
contractor. The use of noncommercial contract clauses offers the ability to issue unilateral 
changes, but has the potential for increasing cost to the contractor due to the increased risk.  
According to the F.A.R. Part 12, “Acquisition of Commercial Items,” contracting 
officers must determine whether an acquisition is a commercial or noncommercial service 
to identify the applicable clauses for the contract. The determination to use a commercial 
or noncommercial service is done during the acquisition plan development phase of the 
contracting process. The commercial and noncommercial contract clauses make a 
significant difference in how changes to both the base award and task orders are managed 
between the government and the contractor. For example, the commercial contract change 
clause requires both parties to bilaterally agree to any change to a contract before it 
becomes a legal obligation. However, the noncommercial contract change clause allows 
the government to make changes within the scope of the contract without consent from the 
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contractor, known as a unilateral change. Unilateral contracts have a greater risk of 
increasing the cost to the government because the contractor will need to be fair and 
reasonably compensated with an equitable adjustment, which will involve negotiation 
between the contractor and the contracting office. As a result, since there is no competition 
when issuing an in-scope unilateral change, the prices are likely to be higher. For example, 
in a situation where the government issues a unilateral task order, the contractor will be 
incentivized to charge higher prices to compensate for the additional risk. Therefore, 
noncommercial clauses likely have an increasing effect on contract cost, increasing overall 
costs to the government. 
5. Statement of Work/Performance Work Statement  
A Statement of Work (SOW) or Performance Work Statement (PWS) is required 
in contracts to inform the contractor of the work expected to be accomplished. A SOW 
contains specific actions required of a contractor (e.g., “Provide a 12-passanger van every 
Monday at 7:00 a.m. regardless of weather conditions”), whereas a PWS describes required 
outcomes (e.g., “Provide ground transportation to/from the airport for transferring five (5) 
Sailors per week”). The SACs contain SOWs that vary between contracts and describe the 
specific needs tailored to the region within the scope. In contrast, MACs use a PWS that is 
derived from a standardized template, resulting in all PWSs having the same structure and 
elements with little variation because the intended outcome is essentially the same. By 
using a PWS, the contractor is empowered to use appropriate means and to leverage their 
strengths or competitive advantage to achieve the outcome. As a result, the use of a PWS 
lowers overall cost and is intended to improve quality.  
6. Minimum Guarantee  
In an IDIQ contract, SAC or MAC, contractors are afforded a minimum order 
quantity, which guarantees the awardee(s) will receive a minimum amount of business. As 
described in F.A.R. 16.5, the contracting office should consider minimum order 
requirements. The terms and conditions for a minimum guarantee is provided for both SAC 
and MAC. However, in a SAC, the single awardee obtains a minimum order guarantee, 
while the MAC provides all awardees a minimum order guarantee. For example, in a SAC 
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the government may guarantee a minimum amount of $3,500 worth of services to just the 
one awardee who is expected to be the best and most qualified according to the base award 
evaluation criteria. Hypothetically, for a MAC with 10 contractors on the base award, all 
10 contractors would receive that same $3,500 minimum order guarantee regardless of 
their past performance. As such, this situation may incentivize a unique form of 
competitive behavior for the MAC. Contractors are incentivized to submit a proposal to be 
awarded the task order but having the minimum guarantee may incentivize awardees to be 
more selective on submitting highly competitively priced proposals, or less selective when 
submitting less competitively priced proposals, knowing they are guaranteed work at some 
point during the length of the contract. For example, a contractor would likely only pursue 
a task order that was in their best interest because the minimum guarantee provides a 
contractor with the assurance of being awarded a minimum amount of work at some point 
during the length of the base contract. Although the minimum guarantee applies to each 
contractor similarly under both contract types, the MAC has greater risk of paying for 
services not rendered based on the greater number of contractors on the base award contract 
relative to the SAC. However, if the minimum order quantity or total number of contractors 
remains small, the dollar value of the minimum guarantee will likely be negligible 
compared to the overall contract. Therefore, the minimum guarantee should be considered 
the least-weighted contract element that could affect price. 
D. EXTERNAL ELEMENTS AFFECTING CONTRACT PRICE 
External elements affecting price refers to factors outside of the written contract 
that could change the price of services between SAC and MAC. Specific examples include 
the changes to the market value of services based on the supply and demand, the pricing 
strategy of the contractors based on their risk and profit, and change to the experience level 
of the contractors across the different region. Each of these external elements affecting 
contract price are described in this section and the estimated effect on price for both SAC 
and MAC. 
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1. Fluctuations in the Fair Market Value of Services Over Time  
The true market value of each service depends on the supply and demand of the 
commodity at the time of the negotiations. Prices for services under a MAC are 
continuously changing based on the prices for the fair market value of services at the time 
of the RTOP. However, the prices for services under a SAC are less sensitive to the market 
and remain more consistent with the historical prices from previous port visits. Therefore, 
the market for services would affect the task order costs for a MAC more than a SAC. As 
a result, price changes within the market for port services could occur more frequently for 
a MAC, which may increase or decrease the prices for services over time.  
2. Contractor Business Strategy and Risk Tolerance 
Contractor price and performance may be influenced by their long-term strategy to 
maintain business with the government. Although contractor fees tend to be higher and 
more lucrative under private commercial acquisitions than in government acquisitions, 
government husbanding contracts tend to be more consistent. Therefore, contractors may 
sacrifice a higher fee to be more competitive in the market in the long run. In a SAC, pricing 
for the entire life of the contract (four years or longer) is determined up front, which 
involves significant risk on the contractor because they will need to predict future costs for 
services. Therefore, it is very likely the contractor will include a risk premium into their 
initial pricing. In comparison, pricing for a MAC is determined by the contractors for each 
individual task order (typically several weeks before work performance) and, therefore, the 
risk is much lower. The unquantifiable business strategy and risk tolerance cannot be 
measured, but we presume this could make prices for the MAC less expensive.   
3. Changes in the Contractor’s Ability and Experience When 
Conducting Market Research 
As the MAC matures over the length of the contract, the offerors will become more 
familiar with the services required by the Navy. Increased familiarity with these services 
will provide the contractors a greater market sense, increased flexibility with changing 
requirements, and more opportunities to form networks with competitors and other 
organizations related to husbanding services. This allows husbanding agents to establish 
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purchase agreements and improve efficiencies. For example, an experienced contractor 
may be aware of a reoccurring naval exercise at a specific port with limited resources and 
attempt to preemptively purchase those assets at a discounted rate, reducing the cost for 
the contractors and price for the government. As a result, the improved market experience 
and efficiencies gained over time under the MAC may allow the contractors to lower their 
proposals on task orders to remain more competitive. By contrast, a contractor under a SAC 
would likely be less motivated to reduce their prices because they are already the sole 
provider for task orders under the contract. Therefore, changes in the experience level of 
contractors could make the prices less expensive for MAC than SAC. 
4. Changes in Profit Margins of Contractors 
Although fee is not part of the cost element, the contractor’s profit margin could 
fundamentally change prices for services. Under a SAC, the contractor proposes prices 
based on an expected profit margin that is set at the start of the contract, whereas a MAC 
provides the opportunity for the contractors to change their profit margin with each RTOP. 
Therefore, the flexibility of changing profit margins over time on a MAC may allow more 
competitive pricing. For example, if a contractor proposes prices on a MAC for a given 
task order at 10% profit but does not get the award, that contractor may decrease their usual 
profit down to 9% to become more competitive for future task orders. Additionally, a 
contractor may choose to sacrifice some margin of profit to gain opportunities for 
establishing performance benchmarks or improve their overall performance rating. As a 
result, changes in profit could potentially cause prices for the MAC to be less expensive. 
E. NON-PRICE FACTORS 
Based on HSP contracts awarded during the last three years, this section identifies 
non-price factors that affect the overall value of the contract between NAVSUP HSP SACs 
and MACs, such as improved schedule or better performance. Identifying these non-price 
factors serves as a qualitative explanation for differences between contract types. During 
the course of this study, five non-price factors were identified that have the potential to 
influence the overall value of the contract type. However, due to lack of measurable data 
and lack of standardization for measuring each non-price factor, we were unable to provide 
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a detailed analysis of each non-priced factor in our study. For example, we reviewed quality 
assurance review and performance ratings to identify qualitative changes to the MAC over 
time. However, we determined that the information provided within the performance 
ratings were not standard across numbered fleet commanders and the data did not provide 
measures of the actual contractor’s performance that could be associated to an individual 
task order or specific service rendered.  
1. Quality Assurance 
All HSP contracts are required to have a quality assurance surveillance plan 
(QASP), which is designed to monitor the contract performance by providing a measurable 
means to evaluate the quality of a contract. Due to increased standardization since 
implementation of MACs, the evaluative quality of the QASP has increased. The QASPs 
found in SACs vary significantly based on region and timeframe because they are 
individually prepared by different offices at different times. The SAC QASP criteria 
specifically address pricing and administrative contract management elements with no 
contractor performance quality comments or customer input. In the MACs, the QASP is 
standardized and more consistent overall because NAVSUP standardized the format across 
all contracting offices. Additionally, the QASP includes direct user feedback in the form 
of contractor performance comments from the ships utilizing the contract. The CORs are 
delegated with the responsibility to ensure this requirement is completed. Figure 4 
illustrates the differences between performance objectives found in a sample QASP for a 




Regional Sample SAC QASP factors: 
Timeliness of PCE submission: Binary 
rating of weather contractor generally 
submitted PCEs within the allotted 
window. 
Contractor submitting information into 
LogSSR (now HS Portal): Binary (and 
subjective) rating of weather contractor 
input data into LogSSR as required by the 
contract. 
Accuracy of invoices submitted: Binary 
(and subjective) rating of weather invoices 
were submitted without errors.  
Maintaining online pricing application: 
Binary rating of the online pricing 
application was utilized. 
Final pricing report submitted: Binary 
rating of weather the contractor submitted 
a pricing report. 
*Note: Binary ratings are either “Yes” or 
“No.”  
 
Standardized MAC QASP factors:  
Quality: Personnel, services, 
measurements, communications, 
support equipment, transportation. 
Schedule: Boarding, tugs/pilots, 
services rendered, cleanliness, force 
protection, daily reconciliation. 
Business Relations: Customer 
service orientation, accuracy and 
timeliness of invoices, customer 
satisfaction surveys. 
Regulatory Compliance: Compliance 
with local authorities, ECMRA 
reporting, human trafficking, 
transparency with costs. 
Small Business Competition 
(applicable within the United States) 
Cost Control Measures 
Figure 4. Differences between SAC and MAC QASPs 
34 
2. Lead Time  
Lead time is measured as the time between when the requirement is submitted by 
the requesting ship and when a task order is issued by the contracting office. For a SAC, 
the solicitation states the notional lead time for issuing the task order for each port. Upon 
awarding the contract, those lead times become part of the contractual agreement at the 
base contract level. This means that the base contract is responsible for holding the 
contractor to their proposed lead time for the entire period of performance. In a MAC, lead 
times are not discussed at the base contract level. The task order’s period of performance 
is stated by the government, and the contractors submitting proposals are expected to meet 
the required timeline(s) for services.  
3. Auditability and Contracting Administration 
In the DoD contracting, auditability refers to the government’s ability to accurately 
trace financial transactions, which conform with an organization’s procurement processes 
and standards. Auditability includes having “competent people, capable processes, and 
effective internal controls to deter procurement fraud” (Rendon & Rendon 2015 , p. 726). 
The main difference between the SAC and MAC in terms of audibility occurs in the RTOP 
phase. During a MAC, each competed task order must conform to the same standards of 
policy, procedures, and determination of fair and reasonableness. In a SAC, there is only 
one contractor and the process for issuing a task order is not competed. As a result, the 
MAC requires an additional amount of documentation for each task order, which includes 
additional risk to auditability. 
All contracts require administrative work to ensure proper processing of paperwork 
and documentation of all business transactions. This includes systems such as Wide Area 
Workflow for payment, System for Award Management for business registration, 
Contracting Officers Representative Tracking Tool, and the Contractor Performance 
Assessment Reporting System for quarterly performance reviews. Under the SAC, only 
one contractor needs to be managed whereas under a MAC, all base contract holders need 
to be administratively managed. This means a greater amount of contract administration 
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would be performed under a MAC than SAC, which includes the additional amount of 
manpower and labor hours to manage. 
4. OPSEC 
Operational Security (OPSEC) refers to the management and protection of sensitive 
information from being transferred between government and contractors. Such information 
may include the dates and locations for husbanding services provided to the Navy. In the 
SAC, all business correspondence regarding a port visit stays between the government and 
the single awardee of the contract, which consists of only two parties. In a MAC, however, 
all potential awardees may be privy to information being shared by the government 
regarding a port visit. As a result, the increased number of parties will increase the risk to 
OPSEC because there will be more personnel that are provided information on the ship’s 
logistical requirements for the port visit. 
5. Dynamic Force Employment  
In the context of HSP services, Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) refers to the 
combat effectiveness and competitive advantage the Navy achieves by remaining flexible 
and unpredictable when conducting port visits around the world. For example, DFE may 
include the ability for the contracting office to adjust to changes in a ship’s schedule or 
support husbanding service requirements for urgent ship repairs in an overseas commercial 
port. In a SAC, there is less flexibility for the government to rapidly respond to new or 
changing requirements because there is only one contractor. In contrast, the MAC is 
competed for each port visit and the criteria for award can change along with the timeframe 
requirements needed by the government. As urgent requirements develop, the MAC has a 
greater capacity of supporting the requirements across a larger network of contractors and 
vendors. Therefore, the MAC has more flexibility to meet the government’s requirements 
when resources are constrained, such as time or limited assets (e.g., brows, brow stands, 
fenders). However, the MAC could hypothetically take longer to award the task orders if 
the contracting office wants to wait for the most competitive proposal. Ultimately, the 
flexibility of the MAC results in greater combat effectiveness across a wide range of 
situations, which includes contingency operations or operating in contested areas. 
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6. Estimating the Value of Non-price Factors 
Quantifying the non-price factors would allow future research to determine whether 
price or non-price factors provide the greatest advantage to the government and determine 
an estimate for the overall value of the MAC. An example of a non-price factor that may 
be valued more important than price could be the responsiveness to warfighter’s needs 
under certain conditions of global conflicts. In a wartime scenario or periods of conflict, 
the service capacity and capability of the contractors servicing ports in contested 
environments could be limited based on the conditions of the infrastructure and economic 
stability of the local community. In a SAC, the Navy could be limited by the support 
capacity and resources provided by a single vendor during wartime conditions. By contrast, 
the MAC could allow the Navy the flexibility to use resources across multiple vendors to 
support the requirements at the time of need.  
The Navy could experience problems similar to the Department of Homeland 
Security when using a sole source IDIQ contract, similar to the SAC, to provide 
humanitarian assistance during a series of hurricanes that impacted the southeastern US in 
2007. As a result of using the sole source IDIQ rather than a MAC, the single vendor 
providing debris removal reached maximum capacity while supporting requirements from 
non-DHS agencies and could not fulfill the minimum requirements for DHS (Mak 2019). 
As demonstrated by this example, SACs and sole source IDIQs could limit the 
opportunities for the government to remain flexible in a changing environment. The MAC 
likely provides greater flexibility and capability of supporting the requirements by using 
multiple contractors rather than relying on one single contractor to provide support. In the 
case of supporting the operational needs of the warfighter during a wartime scenario, the 
flexibility of using a MAC would likely be valued more than price.  
Table 2 summarizes the five non-price factors, possible measurements of those non-
price factors, and the potential effect on the MAC. This table could be used to improve our 
overall understanding of the non-price factors that exist today and assist government 
stakeholder when choosing a contracting strategy. 
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Table 2. Summary of Non-price Factors 
Non-Price Factor Measured by Potential MAC Effect 
Logistics Lead 
Time 
Time between establishment of 
the initial requirement and 
awarding task order. 
Increase time because each 
task order will need to be 
competed using “fair and 
reasonable” determination 
(unless it is not competed). 
Dynamic Force 
Employment 
Adjusting for short notice 
requirements outside the contract 
scope. 
More flexibility to support 
requirements because there are 
multiple contractors, but could 
take longer to award a task 
order. 
Support standard services at non-
standard ports. (Non-standard 
ports are considered any port not 
competed on the base contract.)  
More flexible for multiple 
contractors to support non-
standard ports. 
  
Ability to prepare, execute, and 
manage contracts during conflict 
and/or within contested 
environments. 
Lower risk of not executing 
requirements because the 
contract includes resources 
across multiple contractors. 
Administration 
and Auditability 
The ability for the government to 
show evidence of a ‘fair and 
reasonable’ determination for 
non-price evaluation factors. 
Less risk up front, more risk 
over the length of the contract 
because determination of fair 
and reasonableness reoccurs 
for each task order. 
Time required to complete 
administrative requirements. 
Longer timeframe to issue task 
order. 
Number of administrative 
deliverables. 
Increased administrative 
requirements with issuing task 
orders. 
OPSEC  Number of contractors provided 
information on upcoming ship 
port visits 
Higher risk of OPSEC because 
multiple contractors are made 





Quality performance ratings for 
services provided by the 
contractor 
Higher performance quality 
because contractors need to 
remain competitive to be 





A SAC and MAC operate similarly during the earlier pre-award phase of the 
contract process, but they differ significantly during the award phase. The change from a 
SAC to a MAC strategy not only creates the most obvious difference of competition but 
also changes how potential contractors and the contracting office react to the acquisition 
environment. Additionally, the relevance of specific contract elements influences the 
actions of potential contractors and can affect the overall cost to the government. Table 3 
summarizes the primary differences between SAC and MAC. 
Table 3. Key Differences in Contracts between SAC and MAC 
Element Single Award HSP Contract Multiple Award HSP Contract 
Competition All competition takes place at 
the base contract level 
Each individual task order is competed 
among all base contract awardees 
Number of 
awardees 
One awardee Multiple awardees 





All changes and task orders 
are bilateral 
Government has the right to exercise 
unilateral changes and task orders 
Statement of Work 
(SOW or PWS) 




The single awardee is entitled 
to the minimum order 
guarantee 
All awardees are entitled to a 
minimum order guarantee 
Pricing Contractor proposals list 
services and prices 
Contractor proposals provide list of 
services with ceiling prices that can be 




Varies from contract to 
contract throughout each 
region 
One standardized QASP is utilized in 
all MACs 
Logistics lead time Contractor determined at base 
contract level 




One contractor managed Multiple contractors managed 
Evaluation criteria Lowest Price Technically 
Acceptable (LPTA) / trade-off 
Lowest Price at base and flexible 
criteria at task order level 
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Based on the qualitative comparison made in Chapter III, it is likely that converting 
contracts to MACs would affect the price. Given the qualitative distinction between 
contract types, we speculated that the sum of these elements decrease price when 
transitioning from a SAC to a MAC, appropriately labeled as the “MAC.” The MAC 
terminology can be used to describe both the explanatory variable, including all of the 
contract element differences between SAC to MAC, and the changes resulting from the 
transition from SAC to MAC. We expected that MAC would decrease price based on the 
contracting elements affecting price, primarily caused by the increase in the competition at 
the task order level. This section describes the analysis used to test the hypothesis that a 
SAC and MAC have statistically significant different effects on price and explains the 
design of the regression model used to estimate the MAC effect on price. Additionally, this 
section describes the fixed-effects regression model used to further investigate the MAC 
effect under certain criteria and determine if the costs associated with specific ports or 
service categories are affected more or less by the MAC effect. 
A. SOURCE OF DATA 
Over the last four years, the U.S. Navy has conducted an average of 4.15 port visits 
per day, or roughly 3.89 port visits per year on average for a given ship: albeit the number 
of ship visits per year depends largely on the deployment cycle of the ship and the number 
of active ships in inventory (NAVSUP, n.d.). Every port visit occurrence results in the 
collection and distribution of husbanding services and port service data and information. 
The source data used for this study were retrieved from the Navy’s HS Portal. The HS 
Portal, formerly LogSSR, is an online repository of husbanding service information that 
stores data from Navy port visits worldwide, to include unit price for each service provided 
by the contractor. All data used for this study are unclassified and provided by NAVSUP 
(N7). The COR and other contracting personnel from the respective regions are responsible 
for ensuring invoices and other data sources are properly submitted and for verifying that 
the cost data are accurately recorded in HS Portal. These data constitute the foundation for 
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the price comparison between the SAC and MAC. The sample used for this analysis 
includes individual-level panel data spanning a three-year period, from October 2016 to 
August 2019. We attempted to obtain data prior to October 2016, when the HS Portal 
website was initiated, to increase the sample size. However, previous records and pricing 
data stored in the legacy LogSSR system were no longer available. Given these conditions, 
we limited the research to include only the price data available on the HS Portal website. 
The HS Portal also contains other data sources used to develop the data sample, including 
contracts, statements of work, performance work statements, QASPs, and invoices.  
B. DATA SAMPLE 
The starting sample contained 83,714 observations of individual exhibit line item 
numbers (ELINs) exercised during port visits over the four-year period. An ELIN is an 
alphanumeric identification code assigned to a specific service or contract line item; it is 
used to identify the task order requirements. Both SACs and MACs use the same ELINs to 
identify the services. Each ELIN observation was identified as a SAC or MAC based on 
the contract number. Therefore, the contract number was used to create the MAC dummy 
variable, which separated SAC and MAC data. Additionally, both price and quantity were 
converted to the natural logarithmic form to explain the change in price from SAC to MAC 
as the percentage difference. We used the six data elements listed in Table 4 as the basis 
for the variables used in the model.  
Table 4. Summary and Description of Required Data Elements in the Sample 
Required Data Element Description 
Exhibit Line Item Number 
(ELIN) Displays the nomenclature of the service provided 
Contract number Identifies the contract used for each observation 
Price (P) Provides the price per unit (USD) 
Unit of Issue (UI) Identifies the unit of issue for each service provided 
Platform Type (T) Identifies the platform type 
Quantity (Q) Identifies the quantity of units ordered for each observation 
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The distribution of ELINs exercised as either SAC or MAC within the data sample 
was germane to the study to illustrate that the observations were independent, and 
observations used for SAC were not used for MAC. The HSP MACs were first introduced 
in 2016 and all legacy SACs were eventually phase-replaced by MACs, leading to the full 
HSP MAC implementation in August 2018. The 35 months of data covering a three-year 
inclusive period for this study start with a 21-month period where both SAC and MAC 
were utilized during MAC implementation, followed by a 14-month period of only MACs.  
C. CLEANING THE DATA 
Cleaning the data is an important prerequisite to performing an analysis, as it 
improves the quality of the data sample by excluding incorrect or incomplete information, 
thereby improving the estimation power of the model. Removing the erroneous 
observations reduces the effects on price caused by factors other than the MAC effect and 
increases our confidence that the observed effect is caused by the difference in contract 
type. The following four steps were used to clean the data: 
Step 1. Exclude observations with missing data elements. The first step in 
cleaning the data involved excluding observations with missing required data elements 
such as price, quantity, unit of issue, or ELIN code. These data fields were required for 
each observation in order for the model to achieve the objective of identifying the HSP 
MAC effect on price. Any observation missing one or multiple required data elements was 
omitted from the data sample. A total of 5,484 observations were removed due to missing 
data elements, which represents the majority of observations (52.3%) excluded from the 
model as a result of data cleaning. 
Step 2. Exclude ports outside of base contract. The second step involved 
excluding port visits not included within the SAC base contract award because ports added 
to the SAC via modification were not competed and therefore likely result in a higher price. 
Unfortunately, no data element captured which prices were the result of a contract 
modification and, therefore, we could not control for this effect completely. We developed 
a search criterion used to identify the ports that were potentially added by a contract 
modification. To minimize the effect on prices caused by contract modifications for SAC 
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observation, we manually searched for port visits with fewer than 50 observations in the 
previous three years and reviewed the base contracts to verify that these ports were added 
via modification. We used 50 observations as a threshold because we assumed 50 
represented a high enough frequency of port services exercised for a given port that would 
be assigned to the original base contract and likely not a port added to the base contract via 
a modification. After identifying the ports with less than 50 observations over the three-
year period, we reviewed the contract numbers assigned to those ports and validated those 
ports were added by a modification. One potential bias with our assumption is that there 
could potentially be other ports added by a contract modification that exceeded 50 
observations. Although the data was not available to completely control for the effects of 
contract modifications, we determined this process was an acceptable alternative to 
minimize some of the effect without creating a significant bias based on the small 
percentage of observations excluded (less than 0.1%). Observations that were identified as 
not being part of the base contract were excluded from the analysis to avoid effects on price 
caused by contingency operations or rare occasions. For example, littoral combat ships 
require port visits in atypical locations to support post-delivery sail-around efforts, which 
require modifications to the original HSP base contract or a stand-alone contact. 
Contingency operations or rare occasions include services for ports that were not listed in 
the original base contract and require a modification to the contract. As a result, the 
modification may express prices that were not reflective of the contract type and instead 
capture the effect of the modification.  
Step 3. Exclude miscellaneous ELINs. The third step involved excluding ELINs 
intended to support miscellaneous services, commonly identified as “miscellaneous” 
service categories. These miscellaneous line items did not identify specific service tasks, 
which is necessary for a balanced price comparison between contracts. For example, the 
ELIN for “Other General Charter & Hire Items” appeared 3,042 times, with prices ranging 
from $1.00 to $232,242.70 per lot. One description listed under this ELIN states “[two (2)] 
lineboats for arrival and departure,” and another description states “one (1) pallet jack for 
food stores onload,” exemplifying the diversity of services within these miscellaneous 
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ELINs. As a result, all observations listed as “miscellaneous” were manually reviewed and 
omitted from the model.  
Step 4. Exclude extreme values in price and quantity. The final step was to 
review quantity and unit price to identify and remove potential extreme values. Extreme 
values represent outliers of the data, where the probability of occurrence in a random 
sample is unlikely. The effect of extreme values can skew the results of the model and risk 
understating or overstating the estimation. Extreme values might be caused by the 
contractor’s pricing strategy. For example, some contractors purposely price a service for 
$1 but increase the price of another service to gain a competitive advantage during 
solicitation review. As a result, the true cost of the individual ELIN is masked by deliberate 
pricing actions of the contractor. Therefore, we excluded extreme values prior to 
performing the regression analysis using standardized values (z-score) as the criteria to 
improve the estimation accuracy of the model. Excluding extreme values from the model 
was an involved process with several steps, including a manual review to identify 
observations that should be excluded from the data sample.  
To identify the extreme values, we calculated the standardized value of prices 
within each group composed of the same port, service, and platform type using a standard 
normal distribution. Prices with a standardized value greater than 3.09 and less than 
negative 3.09 were used to identify prices with a probability outside 99.8% of the normal 
distribution, or roughly three standard deviations away from the mean. This method was 
adopted from other research in the field of excluding extreme values and is considered a 
justifiable practice among statisticians (Arkes, 2019). These extreme values were flagged 
as potential observations for removal and required further investigation. However, not all 
flagged values were removed from the model simply because they were outside the 
standard normal confidence interval. Some of the extreme values could be explained by 
the competitive environment created by a MAC or the pricing strategy of the contractors. 
For example, the price per unit for a particular service may appear as extreme simply 
because the total price of the service increased or decreased significantly based on the 
market conditions. This example demonstrates how the extreme values could actually be 
capturing the causal effect of the MAC, which we did not want to exclude from the model. 
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The process for reviewing extreme values was based on criteria established to assess the 
legitimacy of the price and our understanding of the comment descriptions provided in the 
HS Portal website for each observation. Flagged observations that were excluded for non-
qualified prices were any observation that did not meet all three of the following criteria, 
which ascertain if the extreme value captures the actual competitive pricing of the MAC 
and/or some deliberate pricing strategy by the contractors: 
• Observation must have comments with amplifying information 
• Observations must have a comment description that indicates the service 
was provided in full (prorated or partial services were excluded). 
• Observations must have a comment description that matches the 
description of other services within the same fixed effects group. 
D. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A total of 9,769 observations were excluded from the data sample based on the four 
steps used for cleaning the data. Step 1 excluded 5,484 observations, while steps 2 through 
4 were performed concurrently and excluded 4,285 observations. As a result, 73,945 
observations remained after the data cleaning process. After data cleaning, approximately 
36% of the data sample represented observations for SACs and 64% represented 
observations for MACs. Of the 9,769 observations omitted from the model based on the 
data cleaning, 92.7% of the observations for price were excluded from the SAC, while only 
7.3% of observations were excluded for MAC. One possible explanation for SACs having 
the majority of the observations excluded from the model, relative to MAC, is related to 
the potential inaccuracy of pricing data per unit under the SAC. Greater emphasis for 
contract management and oversight, executed by the CORs, was implemented with the 
OSBP policy prior to the rollout of the MAC. As a result, the MACs received the full 
benefit of having a mature process for recording accurate pricing data, while the SAC did 
not. Additionally, the MAC requires a greater need to accurately compare cost per unit 
across all competitive task order proposals to ensure prices were established through a 
determination of fair and reasonableness, whereas a SAC is less competitive for each task 
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order and based on historical pricing data for each contracting region. As a result of the 
data cleaning, our estimation may be over- or understating the true effect of the MAC on 
price based on the larger amount of SAC prices excluded from the model.  
After the data cleaning we developed sample criteria to exclude observation that 
did not contribute to estimating any MAC effect on price. For example, if there were 
observations of prices for SACs under a specific group of ELIN–port–ship, but no 
observations of price for MAC given the identical group, then the SAC observations 
 would be excluded from the fixed-effects model based on the sample criteria. As a result, 
a total of 24,708 observations were used for the data sample after completing the data 
cleaning and assigning the sample criteria for the fixed-effects groups. Figure 5 shows the 
change in distribution of SAC and MAC observations as a result of holding constant the 
fixed effects. 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of SAC and MAC Observations in the Sample 
before and after Applying Fixed Effects Sample Criteria 
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E. DEVELOPING THE FIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR REGRESSION 
To compare costs between SAC and MAC requires a regression model that 
compares costs across an even playing field. To do this, a fixed-effects regression model 
is used to estimate the relationship between an explanatory variable (MAC) and a 
dependent variable (price) by controlling for differences across contract type. The fixed 
effects model in this study compares prices between contract types where the only 
difference is the contract type, while the other factors such as the different ports, services, 
type of platform, and quantity are held constant. Therefore, the objective of the model is to 
estimate the MAC effect on prices of services within similar fixed-effects groups. The first 
step in developing the fixed-effects regression model was identifying the groups, which 
controls for group-invariant differences between SAC and MAC.  
A direct comparison between SACs and MACs is complicated and difficult for 
various reasons. Simply taking the average cost of one ELIN from a SAC and comparing 
it to the average cost of the same ELIN from a MAC would be an inaccurate method for 
analyzing cost differences, because it does not account for the other observed variables that 
could be different across SAC and MAC contracts. For example, directly comparing the 
average unit cost of one hour of a crane rental under a SAC at Singapore to one hour of a 
crane rental under a MAC in Vietnam would not produce meaningful results because the 
difference between prices would be confounded by the inherent difference in prices for 
those regions; services in Singapore naturally cost more. The economies in these countries 
are vastly different; therefore, the costs for each service would be different for each port. 
Additionally, the average cost of services may be different based on the platform type. For 
example, the average cost for a bus rental used by a submarine might be different than the 
average cost for a bus rental used by an aircraft carrier. An aircraft carrier has a service 
consumption rate several times larger than other platform types due to its size. At times, 
there may be cases where the demand for resources exceeds the supply available, and the 
husbanding provider must import services to the region, which may significantly increase 
contract costs.  
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The solution for accurately comparing costs between SACs and MACs for similar 
services, ports, and platforms was using a fixed-effects model that compares contract type 
within groups of identical ELINs, identical ports, and similar platform types. Each group 
controls for the effects that are caused by differences between platform type, ELINs, and 
port. For example, the model compares one observation of a cruiser’s van rental cost at a 
specific port under a SAC to a separate observation of a cruiser’s cost for van rental at the 
same port under a MAC.  
Creating groups of similar ELINs, port, and platform type required categorizing 
platforms by similar size. Categorizing platforms was necessary in the regression analysis 
to increase the number of groups for comparing prices between SAC and MAC, thereby 
ensuring adequate power in the model to obtain more precise estimates. Although the 
classes of ships are not identical, the analysis assumes that these platforms share enough 
similarities in service consumption to make an accurate comparison of costs. Comparing 
the cost of services for identical ships resulted in greater number of fixed-effect groups, 
but reduced the number of observations. Comparing the cost of services by ships of similar 
category resulted in smaller number of fixed-effect groups, but a greater number of total 
observations within the model. Therefore, categorizing the ships decreased the total 
number of groups, but allowed for a greater number of ELIN price comparisons, thereby 
improving our confidence that the regression estimate sample represents the true 
population. The rationale for separating ships into the six categories was balanced evenly 
between the estimated consumption of services (according to the standard logistics 
requisition quantities generated by the fleets) and approximate crew size. Table 5 provides 





Table 5. Classes of Ship by Category 
Category Classes of Ships Size/Function 
1 All MSC vessels  
(T-AKE, T-AOE, etc.) 
Military Sealift Command 
Resupply Ships 
2 DDG, CG, LCS Small Surface Combatants 
3 LPD, LSD Amphibious Combatants 
4 SSN, SSBN, SSGN, MCM, PC Submarine and Smaller Surface 
Combatants 
5 LHD, LHA, LCC Large Deck Non-CVNs 
6 CVN Aircraft Carrier 
Note: Categories are based only on estimated consumption of services 
 
F. FIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR REGRESSION APPLIED 
By using a fixed-effects model, specific variables can be held constant, and a model 
can be developed to explain the true difference in price between a SAC and MAC. In 
particular, the fixed-effects linear regression model allows for comparison of the contract 
types within the groups that controlled for differences of ELIN, platform type, and port. A 
fixed-effects regression method was used to calculate the coefficient estimates and 
confidence intervals for variables within groups, ensuring that the model is only comparing 
prices within the same group. Fixed-effects linear regression uses the following different 
types of variables.  
1. Outcome Variable 
Price is defined as the outcome variable, which is measured in U.S. dollars (USD) 
on a per-unit basis. Each unit change within the outcome variable is explained by the 
change in contract type. The regression model uses invoiced prices as the outcome variable 
which includes the contractor's profit. The logarithmic form of price was calculated to 
transform the outcome variable to a logarithmic scale in order to measure the percentage 
change in price going from SAC to MAC.  
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2. Key Explanatory Variable 
The key explanatory factor for the change in price is the MAC, which is 
characterized by observations that exercise services with the presence of a MAC indicator. 
The MAC indicators were identified by cross-referencing contract numbers on a list 
identifying the contract as SAC or MAC. The observed contract type was used as the key 
explanatory variable in the fixed-effects model. Given that SACs represent the baseline 
and historical contract type used for HSP services, the MAC effect measures the difference 
between price for SAC and MAC. 
3. Control Variables 
Three control variables were considered for the model to capture any observed 
effects on price: quantity, inflation, and rate. These control variables were held constant to 
provide a proper comparison of price between SAC and MAC and ensure there were no 
confounding factors.  
a. Quantity 
Quantity was considered a control variable because the quantity of services ordered 
could change between SAC and MAC. The greater quantity demanded for services could 
affect the price per unit between contract type. Similar to the effect of economies of scale, 
theoretically, the average unit price decreases as the volume purchased increases in the 
long run. This means that ships ordering a greater quantity should have a lower unit price 
for services compared to ships that order a smaller quantity. For example, assume we are 
comparing the MAC prices of oily waste offload between two identical ships, Ship A and 
Ship B (see Table 6). Ship A used the port visit as a liberty port and only removed 200 
cubic meters of oily waste. On the other hand, Ship B used the port visit as a maintenance 
port and removed 200,000 cubic meters of oily waste. The magnitude of quantities ordered 
between the two ships could potentially affect unit price based on the composition of 
overhead costs and fixed costs per unit. Continuing with the previous example, if the oily 
waste removal has a fixed cost of $1,000 per service plus $1 for every cubic meter removed, 
then the unit cost for the Ship A would be $6 and the unit cost for the Ship B would be 
$1.005. Therefore, a control variable for quantity was included into the model to ensure 
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that the price comparison between SAC and MAC was not due to differences in the quantity 
of husbanding services ordered.  
Table 6. Example Unit Quantity Cost 
 Ship A–Liberty Port Ship B–Maintenance Port 
Fixed cost $1,000 $1,000 
Order quantity 200 200,000 
Variable cost $1 / meter cubed $1 / meter cubed 
Total cost $1,200 $201,000 
Per unit cost $6 $1.005 
 
b. Inflation 
To control for the inflation rate and changes in port, a consumer price index dummy 
inflation variable, also called a trend effect, was created for each port over the four-year 
period. Cost for each ELIN varies significantly depending on location. Each country has a 
different inflation rate, and many countries have micro-economies, which can influence 
service costs. For example, the cost of a gallon of potable water in Yokosuka, Japan, is 
different from the cost of a gallon of water in Tokyo, Japan—based on the different costs 
associated with those markets. The inflation rates may be considered negligible for one 
region over a four-year period. However, the difference in inflation rates across all  
the sampled ports in aggregate could significantly misrepresent the effect of contract type 
on cost.  
c. Exchange Rates  
All cost data is provided in USD; however, the true value of the USD depends on 
the exchange rate at the time of transaction. Therefore, an exchange rate variable was 
created to control for the effects of changing exchange rates. Exchange rate data for the 
United States for the inclusive time period of the data sample was obtained from Federal 
Reserve Economic Data, which is maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  
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4. Omitted Variables 
Some of the other determinants of price may be impossible to control for in the 
model; these are considered omitted variables. A fixed-effects model is used to better 
control for the unobserved heterogeneous effect of the change between contract type. 
However, there are still other unavoidable factors influencing price that could be different 
across SAC and MAC, which could create confounding effects in the price differences and 
cause biased results from our model. The actual number of unobservable individual effects 
that exist can never be known for certain, but an estimate can be made. Examples of 
potential omitted variables are described below. For each omitted factor described below, 
we discuss potential causes for the difference between SAC and MAC and indicate the 
direction of the bias on the estimate of price. 
a. Unethical Behavior  
The model developed does not account for unobserved or potential unethical 
behaviors within HSP contracting, such as price gouging, collusion, and bid rigging. 
Although the Navy has converted to an OSBP system that segregates responsibilities and 
adds redundancy to safeguard against criminal interests, it would be unwise to assume that 
the pricing data is completely immune to such activity or other exploitation. Although the 
risk of unethical behavior is minimal across both SAC and MAC with the current OSBP 
system, each contract type responds differently to the various forms of unethical behavior, 
which changes the effect of competition. According to The Responsible Contract Manger, 
“corruption can make fair competition impossible,” which applies to both contract types 
differently because the competition at the task order level is different (Cohen & Eimicke, 
2008, p. 26). Under a SAC, a single contractor provides husbanding services, which does 
not allow for collusion during the task order proposal. In a MAC, price gouging is more 
unlikely because the contractors need to remain competitive for each task order proposal, 
but the opportunities for collusion are greater. Because both contract types respond 
differently to types of unethical behavior, it is unclear which direction this bias would  
affect price. 
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b. Changes from Market Anomalies and Special Events 
A number of diverse events can take place that affect market conditions, such as 
natural disasters, multinational exercises, multiple Navy ships’ visits, or fluctuating 
strength of foreign economies. This study does not consider the market fluctuations in 
prices that may result from such activities. For example, naval exercises like the Rim of 
the Pacific exercise occur every two years, which causes scarcity of shared resources 
among naval and commercial ships in that region. The surge in prices is known to exist, 
but there is no mechanism to control for this rapid fluctuation during the time period that 
the MAC was being implemented. As a result, these rare occurrences may have occurred 
under one contract type but not the other. Because the pricing changes caused by anomalies 
and special events likely follow the same behavior as the prices during market fluctuations, 
we assume that this phenomenon would have greater effect on price in the MAC than SAC. 
Based on the theory of supply and demand, we suspect that the effect of these rare 
occurrences would likely increase prices for the MAC. 
c. Changes to PWS/SOW and Tiered-Pricing System 
This study does not account for SAC and MAC differences in PWS or SOW, such 
as the volumetric pricing system and vehicle mileage limitations. A SOW is used to 
describe the requirements of a SAC, while a PWS is used to describe the requirements of 
a MAC. In the SAC, all unit prices are static in the base award, and the same unit price 
does not change regardless of the quantity ordered. In the MAC, a volumetric pricing 
system was developed where the contractor can propose tiered pricing during the RTOP 
phase. In a tiered-pricing system, the price per unit changes based on a range of quantities. 
For example, the tiered-pricing scheme may establish one price per unit of waste removal 
less than 50 cubic meters and a different price per unit for waste removal greater than 50 
cubic meters. In addition to the volumetric pricing system, some ELINs’ pricing standards 
were changed based on the rental agreements. For example, vans were authorized limited 
mileage under a SAC, but unlimited mileage under a MAC. The direction of the bias could 
change depending on the quantity ordered for MAC but remain unchanged for the SAC. 
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Therefore, the effect of MAC on price may be influenced by changes caused by the tiered-
pricing system. 
G. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
We developed the fixed-effects model over several iterations and tested the model 
through a trial-and-error process to determine the best estimate for the MAC effect on cost. 
The baseline model included a sample of all ports with the trend variables excluded. The 
second iteration of the model included the same sample of all ports but included the trend 
variables to capture port-specific inflation effects. Comparing the first two models 
demonstrated the importance of controlling for inflation by including the trend variables 
for all ports. Finally, a third iteration of the model was developed that included only ports 
with a coefficient estimated on its trend variables by using the results from the previous 
model. The trend variables were included for only those ports with a coefficient estimate, 
because the MAC effect could be influenced by the inflation in ports without data to 
estimate their trend effect. 
Unfortunately, the effects from the trend variables used for the model resulted in 
negative coefficients, meaning that the inflation term decreased the MAC effect on price. 
Although there may be some ports that exhibit an effect of deflation due to the cheaper 
costs of services over time, it is more likely that the trend variables were capturing an 
unobserved effect. We believe that the unobserved effect being captured by the trend 
variable were caused by fluctuations in the market value of services over time and by the 
increased competitive pricing among contractors, which would explain the negative 
coefficients. These unobserved effects can best be explained as quasi-omitted variables, 
which are variables that are intended to control for omitted variables but instead introduce 
other omitted variable effects. Therefore, we decided to remove the inflation control 
variable and use the baseline model as the most accurate method for hypothesis testing and 
estimation of the MAC effect.  
Although we chose to remove the inflation based on quasi-omitted variable bias, 
we know that inflation exists, and we would expect inflation to increase prices of services 
over time. We concluded that the trend variable we used to measure the effect of inflation 
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was also likely capturing changes to the market conditions over time. The changes to the 
market condition would likely only affect prices in a MAC based on competing task orders 
on a reoccurring basis. Meanwhile, prices for services under SAC would remain less 
dependent of market conditions because prices are fixed. Therefore, knowing fluctuations 
of prices exist within each market for port-services, the confounding effect of market 
conditions were interfering with the true effect of inflation. As a result, our regression did 
not capture the effects of inflation.  
The baseline fixed-effects linear regression model, labeled Model 1, was used to 
create two additional fixed-effects models to explain the MAC effect for specific ports and 
specific service categories. Model 2 was used to evaluate and quantify any port-specific 
MAC effects. A total of 338 ports were analyzed for port-specific effects using the same 
sample criteria from the main model, with one additional sample criterion to account for 
the large number of ports omitted from the sample: only ports with a coefficient estimate 
for port-specific MAC were included within the data sample to avoid any effect caused by 
ports without data to estimate their port-specific effect. This was an iterative process that 
first required running the regression model, then assigning a dummy variable to identify 
ports with enough observations to estimate the port-specific MAC effect and ports without 
a coefficient estimate. A total of 237 ports were omitted from Model 2 based on port-
specific sample criteria.  
Model 3 was used to calculate service-specific MAC effects to understand how the 
MAC effect changed for each service category and identify which service categories had 
the largest MAC effect on price. We divided services into 18 categories according to the 
ELIN category names provided in the HS Portal website and used this category identifier 
to analyze the MAC effect under the same sample criteria as the primary model. Table 7 




Table 7. Common Services Provided for Each Service Category 




Forklift, & Manlift  
EA, GP, 
HR 
Platform to transit in/off ship and vehicles that move 
material 
Collection, Holding, 
and Transfer  
MT, CM Services to remove wastewater (pier side or anchored) 
Fleet Landing  EA Rental of location/platform to disembark ship 
Force Protection 
Barriers  
EA, DZ Management of Physical barriers to control foot traffic 
Force Protection 
Personnel & Equip  
EA, DZ, 
GP 
Pier security personnel and equipment such as x-ray 
machines and metal detectors  
Force Protection 
Supplies  
Various Other items required for force protections such as 
forms, reflector vests, and signage 
Fresh Potable Water  MT, CM Drinkable water that meets US Navy standards 
General Charter & 
Hire Items  
EA, GP Miscellaneous category to capture all other General 
Charter & Hire items. 
General Utility  Various Power connection between ship and pier  
Husbanding Fees  DY Fee charged by the husbanding agent for coordination 
of all services provided.  
Land Transportation 
(Personnel)  
HR/DY Hiring drivers of rented vehicles such as buses and 
utility trucks/vans 
Provisions  Various Food required for subsistence 
Ship Movement 
Services  
DY/HR Cost to have Tugs and other equipment on standby for 
short-notice departures. 
Telephone Services  Various Rental of cell phones and portable WIFI 
Trash Removal  CM Removal of solid waste 
Water Ferry/Taxi 
Services  
HR/DY Hiring water taxis to transport personnel from ship to 
fleet landing area 
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The three models are labeled and summarized in Table 8. Each model was based 
on a 95% confidence interval, or an alpha of 0.05. Alpha represents the probability of 
committing a Type I error, meaning the probability that the null hypothesis is true.  
Table 8. Summary of Fixed-Effects Regression Models 
Model Number Description 
Model 1 Sample criteria includes same port, service, and ship type 
with observations for both SAC and MAC over time 
Model 2 Same sample criteria as Model 1, but the key explanatory 
variables are port dummy variables, showing port-specific 
MAC effects 
Model 3 Same sample criteria as Model 1, but the key explanatory 
variables are service categories, showing service-specific 
MAC effects 
 
H. MODEL FRAMEWORK 
Chapter III discussed the various elements that could affect differences in price 
between SAC and MAC. From this qualitative comparison, we formulated the framework 
of our regression model, which captures the effects of these elements into two mechanism 
of the MAC. The first mechanism is that the MAC increases the amount of competition, 
which decreases the price. The second mechanism is that the MAC improves the pricing 
strategy of the contractors, which also decreases the price. In our model, the estimate for 
β1 captures the effects of both mechanism and is designed to measure the change in price 
from SACs to MACs, while holding other factors constant. Therefore, the effect of the 
MAC on price captures the increased competition and pricing strategy, and controls for 
exchange rate and quantity ordered, using within-group fixed effects. The effect can be 
explained graphically in Figure 6, which represents the basis of our theory that the MAC 
decreases price for the government. Although we know that the effect of inflation exists, 
we chose not to include inflation as a mediating factor in the graphic interpretation due to 
quasi-omitted variable bias. 
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Figure 6. Graphical Interpretation of Model Framework 
I. QUANTIFYING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The hypothesis that the average price for SACs is different from the average price 
for MACs is defined as 
Ho: PSAC = PMAC 
Ha: PSAC ≠ PMAC, 
where  
P = the natural log of price for SAC and MAC. 
The null hypothesis assumes that there is no difference between average price of 
SAC and MAC type contracts. The hypothesis test is using a two-tailed test based on a 
95% confidence level, which means the alpha for this model is 0.025. A least squares linear 
fixed-effects regression was developed to conduct the hypothesis testing and estimate the 
MAC effect. The following formula postulates the relationship between contract type and 
price 





Pirfs =  the natural log of price for contract (i) in port (r), for function (f), and for 
class of ship (s)  
MAC = dummy variable for type of contract 
Q = variable that indicates the natural log of quantity ordered 
X = exchange rate for a given time (t) 
α = fixed effects of port, function, ship groups 
ε = error term 
 
The observed p value was used to test the hypothesis that the price difference 
between SACs and MACs were statistically different. However, there is an ongoing debate 
across the statistics community over the true interpretation of p values and confidence 
intervals when determining the significance of relationships using empirical data. The 
American Statistical Association released a statement that provides principles for 
interpreting the p value (Wasserstein, 2016). Researchers suggest that the probability of 
the estimate being accurate is dramatically less than what the confidence interval 
adequately assumes. For example, Sellke, et al. (2001) evaluated the fallacy of using p 
values by calculating the odds of conducting a Type II error (i.e., failing to reject a null 
hypothesis when it should be rejected), using a Bayesian reasoning. Selke’s research 
determines that the true likelihood that the relationship is accurate based on a p value of 
0.05 is actually much less than 95%. Although we recognize the purpose of avoiding false 
conclusions based on the p values, we are confident making determinations of statistical 
significance based on the large sample size and relatively small p values (<0.001). 
The results section describes the difference between costs for SAC and MAC as 
“statistically significant.” Readers should be cautious when interpreting statistical 
significance because it can lead to false dichotomous conclusions. Wasserstein et al. (2019) 
suggest that researchers should refrain from using the words “statistically significant” and 
consider alternative descriptions of the relationships and effects. By contrast, other 
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statisticians are comfortable using the p value as evidence of the results’ statistical 
significance if the p value threshold is less than 0.005 (Benjamin et al., 2018; Johnson et 
al., 2013). For this study, we remained conservative and reserved the term “statistically 
significant” for p values less than or equal to 0.001, or a 99.9% probability that the results 
are true, with a 95% confidence interval.  
J. SUMMARY 
In preparation for performing the empirical portion of this study and testing the 
hypothesis, the observed data sample was filtered for either inaccurate or incomplete data. 
Additionally, three fixed-effects linear regression models were developed to estimate the 
effect of the MAC on price, which control for type of service, ship type, port, quantity, and 
exchange rate. Overall, given the contracting data collected, we are highly confident that 
the regression model developed for conducting the analysis best describes the relationship 









Chapter IV explained the data variables and the three regression models designed 
to analyze the price data between SACs and MACs. Model 1 was used to determine if the 
mean of prices for SAC and MAC are different and analyze the overall relationship 
between price and the MAC. Models 2 and 3 were used to determine changes to prices 
caused from the MAC based on port-specific and service-specific criteria. Put differently, 
we identified if the MAC changes prices based on the port or category of services. The next 
step was running the regression models and examining the results. We used Stata16 
(statistical software version 16 created by StataCorp). 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter interprets and explains the results of the quantitative analysis, all of 
which support our conclusion: we concluded that there is a significant difference between 
average price of SACs and MACs. The MAC did, on average, decrease the price for 
services, and the magnitude of the effect on price varied based on the specific port or 
service category.  
B. EXTREME RESIDUALS 
To illustrate the sensitivity of the results to extreme residuals, Figure 7 shows the 
coefficient of the MAC on the primary model after each iteration of assessing the 
standardized residuals. With each iteration of removing extreme residuals, a greater 
number of MAC observations were being omitted relative to the number of SAC 
observations. The MAC observations below the mean price were being omitted, meaning 
the MAC was less inexpensive after each iteration. Therefore, the coefficient estimate of 
the MAC on price became more positive, and the difference in prices between SAC and 
MAC decreased as the number of iterations increased. Although we are not certain why the 
MAC had a greater number of extreme residuals, one possible explanation could be that 
the extreme values were the result of the abnormal market prices during the MAC 
transition, while the competitive prices were still being established. Another possible 
explanation could be the result of the omitted variable discussed in Chapter IV, or possibly 
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some other unknown effect that was not included in the model. A total of 1,188 
observations were removed from the model, which 82.5% of the total extreme residuals 
removed were MAC observations. 
The Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) was also measured after each iteration of 
removing extreme price values to assess the error between the model’s explanation of the 
MAC on price and the data sample’s actual relationship. The RMSE measures the error 
between the sample data points and the fixed-effects regression line. The RMSE decreased 
after each iteration of removing extreme values, which was expected as we reduced the 
amount of error. Both the estimate of the MAC on price and the RMSE approach a limit as 
the iterative process approaches an infinite number of iterations. Given the primary model 
used to analyze the overall MAC effect, we assess the coefficient estimate and RMSE are 
less sensitive and responsive to extreme variables after four iterations of removing extreme 
residuals. Therefore, we chose the fourth iteration as a preferred model as the basis for 
reporting our results. However, to remain more objective in the results, the tables for each 
model also includes the results prior to removing extreme residuals as a reference and 
comparison between our preferred method and the unmodified results.  
 
Figure 7. Graph of Change in Percent of Price and RMSE with 
Iterations of Removing Extreme Residuals 
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C. MODEL 1: PRIMARY REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Model 1, the primary model, was used to test the null hypothesis and determine if 
there is a statistically significant difference between prices for SACs and MACs. Table 9 
shows the results from the regression analysis, which describes in statistical terms—
holding other factors constant—how the MAC significantly reduces the prices for 
husbanding services overall. The regression results indicate a coefficient estimate of -0.320 
before removing extreme residuals and -0.195 for the preferred method, meaning there is 
a strong negative relationship. The percent increase or decrease was obtained by using the 
exponential function of the logarithmic coefficient, subtracting by one, and then 
multiplying by 100 (Ford, 2018). The estimate from the model thus indicates that given an 
average price of an ELIN under a SAC, the average price of a MAC for the same ELIN 
and under the same conditions of ship type and port, will, on average, cost 17.7% less. The 
95% confidence interval for the preferred model indicates a range of difference in price 
decrease between 20.6% and 14.8% for the MAC using the preferred method. Although 
the 99% confidence internal is not shown in the table, the results indicate a difference in 
price ranging between -0.148 (13.8% decrease) and -0.242 (21.4% decrease) for the MAC 
using the preferred method. The results of the two-tailed test from Model 1 show that the 
explanatory variable, labeled “MAC,” which measures the difference in means of prices 
between SAC and MAC, had a p value of 0.000. Since the p value was less than alpha, 
our results indicate that our null hypothesis should be rejected and supports our theory that 
the prices between a SAC and MAC are statistically different. 
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Table 9. Fixed-Effects Regression Results for Model 1 
  Before Removing Extreme Residuals   


























Log(Quantity) -0.375 ** 0.009 -0.392 -0.358  -0.366 ** 0.008 -0.381 -0.351 
Exchange 
 
0.021 ** 0.003 0.016 0.026  0.013 ** 0.002 0.008 0.017 
Constant 2.801 ** 0.309 2.194 3.407   3.951 ** 0.262 3.437 4.465 
 Results are based on 95% confidence intervals 
 Statistical significance based on ** p<0.001, * p<0.01      
 
D. MODEL 2: PORT-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS 
Model 2 was used to identify the effect of the MAC on price for individual ports 
and determine if the difference in price between SAC and MAC changes based on different 
ports. Using the results from Model 2, we selected the top 25 ports based on the total 
number of observations to analyze the MAC effects for these 25 different ports. Although 
there a total of 338 ports were analyzed for the port-specific MAC effects, we arbitrarily 
used 25 as a cutoff to display concisely in the table; but, we intentionally selected ports 
with the greatest number of observations to increase the statistical power of those estimates. 
The results for the remaining 313 ports are shown in the Appendix.  
Of the top 25 ports we identified from Model 2 after removing extreme residual, 
14 of these indicated a p value of less than 0.001, which we considered statistically 
significant (see Table 10). Of the top 25 ports, 10 show a negative relationship between 
price and the MAC, meaning the prices were less expensive for MAC relative to SAC. The 
port with the most negative coefficient estimate for the MAC was Augusta Bay, which had 
a 95% confidence interval between -1.407 (75.51% decrease) and -0.979 (62.43% 
decrease). The remaining four statistically significant ports show a positive effect of the 
MAC on price, with Fujairah having the largest coefficient estimate and a 95% confidence 
interval between 0.992 (169.66% increase) and 1.228 (241.44% increase). 
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There is a possibility that the positive coefficients could be the result of some other 
effect, either one of the omitted variables we identified early on, or potentially another 
unobserved variable not identified in the model. Another possibility is that the positive 
effects from the mechanism of pricing strategy could have a greater effect on price than the 
negative effects from increased competition, which could theoretically increase prices for 
services as the market matures. Although we are not certain of the explanation for the 
positive coefficient of the MAC in these four ports, Type 1 errors were a possibility that 
we considered before making any conclusions for individual ports. There is a generally 
acceptable standard among statisticians, when performing a regression analysis, that Type 
1 errors occur in about 5% of the statistically significant relationships due to natural 
variation (Arkes, 2019). As a result, if there was no effect of the MAC on price, then we 
would expect roughly 17 ports (5%) of the total 338 ports would have a statistically 
significant coefficient estimate, either positive or negative, but in actuality, do not share a 
relationship. Thus, some of the 14 statistically significant ports could actually be Type 1 
errors. Therefore, it would be false to use the results of Model 2 to make claims that specific 
ports are more or less favorable at reducing prices from the MAC. However, based on the 
preponderance of negative coefficients relative to positive coefficients, we can safely 
conclude that the effect of the MAC on price changes based on the individual port and the 
preponderance of the statistically significant coefficient estimates were negative, meaning 
the MAC was less expensive than SAC. 
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Table 10. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Model 2 
Ports 
Before Removing Extreme Residuals After Removing Extreme Residuals (Preferred Method) 
Obs.  Confidence Interval (%)  S. Err. Obs. Confidence Interval (%)  S. Err. 
Jebel Ali  3835 0.039 (3.98) 
0.227 
















Djibouti  2472 -0.442 (-35.73) 
-0.208 




(-12.54) ** 0.049 
Fujairah  1616 0.608 (83.68) 
0.884 




(241.44) ** 0.060 
Mina Salman  1444 -0.486 (-38.49) 
-0.117 






Augusta Bay  959 -1.871 (-84.6) 
-1.37 




(-62.43) ** 0.109 
Al Duqm  843 -0.766 (-53.51) 
-0.383 




(-44.23) ** 0.083 
Salalah  680 -0.194 (-17.63) 
0.256 
(29.18) 
 0.115 624 0.149  (16.07) 
0.526  
(69.22) ** 0.096 
Sasebo  664 -0.986 (-62.69) 
-0.6 




(-41.9) ** 0.080 
Chinhae  614 -0.758 (-53.14) 
-0.343 




(-27.67) ** 0.088 
Piraeus  553 -1.043 (-64.76) 
-0.47 




(-18.54) ** 0.124 
Muscat 483 0.133 (14.22) 
0.594 




(124.79) ** 0.105 
Manila  380 -0.803 (-55.2) 
-0.217 















(-58.6) ** 0.148 
Faslane  364 -1.71 (-81.91) 
-0.899 




(-42.65) ** 0.170 
Yokosuka  331 -0.947 (-61.21) 
-0.347 




(-41.37) ** 0.126 
Pusan 








(-23.74) ** 0.121 
Doha  278 -0.471 (-37.56) 
0.154 
(16.65) 




Brisbane  236 -0.15 (-13.93) 
0.506 
(65.86) 




Abu Dhabi 208 -0.904 (-59.51) 
0.264 
(30.21) 




Hong Kong  179 -0.304 (-26.21) 
0.459 
(58.25) 




Rodman  168 -1.465 (-76.89) 
-0.631 




(-44.90) ** 0.173 
Aqaba 167 -0.769 (-53.65) 
0.153 
(16.53) 




Haakensvern  165 -1.23 (-70.77) 
-0.12 
(-11.31) 
 0.282 154 -1.434  (-76.16) 
-0.492  
(-38.86) ** 0.240 
Townsville  158 -0.545 (-42.02) 
0.3 




(60.80)   0.179 
 Results are based on 95% confidence intervals (CI)    
 Statistical significance based on ** p<0.001, * p<0.01    
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E. MODEL 3: SERVICE-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS 
Model 3 was used to identify service-specific MAC effects on price and determine 
if the difference in price between SAC and MAC changes based on different service 
categories. Table 11 provides the results for the Model 3 regression. The results for the 
preferred method indicate that 13 of the 16 service categories were statically significant, 
with p values less than 0.001. Of the 16 service categories, 11 represented a statistically 
significant negative relationship between the MAC and price, meaning that MACs were 
less expensive than SACs for the statistically significant service categories. General Utility 
Services showed the most negative coefficient estimates (between -1.566 and -2.34 at a 
95% confidence interval) and Provisions showed the most positive coefficient estimates 
(between 1.190 and 4.356 at a 95% confidence interval). However, both of these service 
categories had the fewest number of observations in their respective fixed effect group: 11 
observations for Provisions and 147 observations for General Utility Services. Therefore, 
these large coefficient estimates could be more representative of the smaller sample size 
within those groups than the actual effect of the MAC on price. Collection, Holding and 
Transfer and Fresh Potable Water services were also statistically significant and have 
relatively large negative coefficient estimates with a relatively larger sample size, 699 and 
1,008 observations, respectively. Collection, Holding and Transfer showed coefficient 
estimates at the 95% confidence level between -0.504 (39.59% decrease on price) and -
0.848 (57.17% decrease on price), while Fresh Potable Water showed coefficient estimates 
between -0.616 (45.99% decrease in price) and -0.914 (59.91% decrease in price). One 
pattern that we recognized with these two services in particular is they both use volumetric 
units of measurement for calculating price per unit. The results could show that the 
mechanism for pricing strategy, which was affected by the tired pricing system, could have 
a greater negative effect on price than the negative effect of competition on price. 
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Table 11. Fixed-Effects Regression Results for Model 3 
  Before Removing Extreme Residuals After Removing Extreme Residuals (Preferred Method) 
 Confidence Interval 
(as percent) 
 Std. Obs. Confidence Interval 
(as percent) 
Std. 










(-14.53) ** -0.038 
 Husbanding Fees -0.501 (-39.41) 
-0.321 




(-6.76) ** -0.039 









(-7.96) ** -0.046 
 General Charter & 


















(-30.44) ** -0.052 
Brow, Crane, 








(65.04) ** -0.058 
Trash Removal  -0.551 (-42.36) 
-0.282 




(-24.95) ** -0.057 
Fresh Potable Water  -1.012 (-63.65) 
-0.654 











 -0.102 747 -0.53 (-41.14) 
-0.178 
(-16.31) ** -0.090 
Collection, Holding, 








(-39.59) ** -0.088 
Fleet Landing  -1.014 (-63.72) 
-0.494 




(-29.74) ** -0.111 









































(-79.11) ** -0.197 
 Provisions  0.855 (135.14) 
4.708 




(7694.4) ** -0.808 
 Results are based on 95% confidence intervals 
   






F. DISCUSSION AND CAVEATS 
The results of the primary model, which includes all ports and service categories, 
shows that the MAC reduces the average price of an ELIN by 17.7% based on the preferred 
model but the estimate of the effects ranged from a 27.4% decrease in price to a 13.8% 
decrease in price depending on the number of iterations of removing extreme residuals or 
the confidence level of the estimates. Both exchange rate and quantity had low values of 
standard error for their respective coefficient estimates, meaning that the predicted values 
of the betas were highly accurate. The estimated effect of the MAC on price changes 
dramatically based on either the type of service being provided or the port used for 
executing the services. 
Although the methods for developing our models are grounded in solid academic 
practices, we caution readers to remain critical of the results when formulating an opinion 
of the effect of the MAC on price. For example, one way to misinterpret the results of 
Model 2 would be to assume that the 14 statistically significant ports accurately represent 
the entire population of observed prices. A reader might incorrectly conclude that the Navy 
should avoid ship visits to ports that had a positive relationship between price and the 
MAC, misinterpreting that these ports are more expensive. Our model was not used to 
compare costs between ports, but rather comparing prices between SACs and MACs at 
different ports. A better way to interpret the results is that on average, MACs are typically 
less expensive than SACs for a given port. It is also important to remember that the results 
represent one interpretation of the relationship between the contract type and price based 
on the model we used to interpret the sample data, and furthermore, this model is not the 
actual relationship of the true population of HSP prices. Put simply, there is enough 
randomness and variation in the data that it would be inappropriate to base a conclusion on 
which ports provide the best value to the government based on these port-specific results. 
These results were intended to highlight the changes to the estimated effect of MAC on 
price as opposed to which ports provide the least cost to the government; the latter is 
already tracked by regional HSP contracting personnel and measured based on port-cost 
estimates and historical cost and pricing data. 
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Another important caveat is that the results of our model do not universally apply 
to all types of IDIQ contracts. Although we found statistically significant results in our 
comparison between SAC and MAC, these results can only be applied to the husbanding 
service contracts and not translate directly to all types of IDIQ contracts from other 
organizations. Our results do not imply that all types of IDIQ contracts across the Navy or 
the DoD display statistically significant relationships between price and contract type 
because there may exist other factors outside of HSP program that are not considered in 
our model and could have a greater effect on price. For example, negotiating with offerors 
over program data rights of proprietary information might apply to a non-HSP related 
program but does not apply to our model. Overall, the results of this study should be used 
as an indicator and to establish an initial data point at estimating the effects of competition 
and other pricing strategy factors on price for MACs. 
G. SUMMARY  
The results of the three models provides evidence that supports our theory that the 
MAC has a statistically significant effect on price. To this end, we are confident making 
the claim that the price for the average service for a MAC-type contract is less expensive 
than a SAC. However, based on the sensitivity to extreme values, the degree of certainty 
to which this estimate predicts the effect of MAC-type contracts on price is still not fully 
known.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Using a fixed-effects linear regression model, we determined that the 
implementation of a MAC strategy for HSP services had a statistically significant effect on 
price, and although the effects varied greatly based on location and service category, we 
found that the full causal effect of the MAC, on average, reduces the price for a given 
service by 17.7%. Therefore, we can conclude that the overall increase in daily costs per 
port visit for FY19, introduced in Figure 1 in Chapter I, is likely not caused by the MAC 
and results from some other effects. 
Our results are important for Navy stakeholders and senior leadership because these 
findings validate the theory that the MAC contracting strategy is a more affordable 
acquisition approach overall than SAC for HSP services. The MAC strategy is consistent 
with the Better Buying Power initiative and exemplifies contracting best-practices within 
the Navy. Given the high visibility and audits of the HSP program over the last decade, 
this report provides objective evidence showing that the MAC strategy is effectively 
reducing costs for husbanding services for the Navy, which enables leadership to make 
informed decisions regarding future changes to the HSP acquisition strategy.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY AND PROCESS 
CHANGES 
Based on the findings of our research, we identified several recommendations and 
opportunities for future studies for HSP stakeholders to consider.  
1. Recommendation #1. Improve Accuracy of Pricing Data 
One of the problems that we recognized during the data cleaning portion of our 
research was the inaccuracy and inconsistency of pricing data for each ELIN. Some of the 
pricing data from the invoices did not represent the true price of the services because 
contractors would erroneously price some ELINS by an inconsistent unit of issue. We also 
recognized various instances where the data was entered erroneously: either the quantity-
price combination was reversed, or the unit of issue was mislabeled. We recognized that 
the database contains manual inputs from multiple contracting offices and CORs. 
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Therefore, some of the data entry issues from the sample may have affected the results of 
the model. We recommend that contracting personnel providing oversight on the HSP 
contracts ensure that the pricing data certified in Wide Area Workflow for each ELIN is 
consistently capturing the same unit quantity.  
2. Recommendation #2. Measure Effects of Competition on Price with 
On-ramp and Off-ramps in Global MAC 
Throughout the course of our research we determined that increased competition 
from SAC to MAC decreased price. However, we did not measure the effects of 
competition internal to the MAC to analyze the effect of competition on price between 
MACs. A series of follow-on questions to our research would be: what are the effects of 
price based on the number of task order proposals received for each port visit, what are the 
effects on price based on number of contractors eligible on the base award contract 
competing for each task order, and lastly, how would the effects change if the number of 
contractors on the base award contract periodically changed throughout the length of the 
contract? NAVSUP is currently working on an initiative to implement a global MAC, 
which would offer opportunities for on-ramping/off-ramping contractors throughout the 
performance period.  
On-ramps and off-ramps are decision points throughout the length of the contract 
which allow the government to increase or decrease the number of contractors included on 
the base contract. On-ramps provide the government with the opportunity to include new 
entrants into the market, thereby increasing the competition at the task order level. 
Increasing the number of contractors on an IDIQ contract, and consequently increasing the 
MAC effect, would theoretically reduce the prices. However, the effects of competition on 
price may have diminishing returns and approach a limit as the number of contractors are 
added to the base contract. To explore this notion further, a follow-on study could research 
the optimal number of contractors to award on an HSP MAC. With off-ramps, the 
government has the opportunity to remove poor performing contractors or contractors that 
fail to submit a minimum number of proposals. The process of including an off-ramp may 
appear illogical because removing contractors directly decreases competition. However, 
without an off-ramp to remove underperforming contractors, the government wrongfully 
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assumes every contractor on the MAC remains equally competitive for each task order. 
Additionally, from the contractor’s perspective, the risk of an off-ramp creates greater 
willingness to bid on port visits despite potentially greater opportunity costs with 
commercial non-Navy businesses. This behavior among the contractors needs to be 
reinforced by the government for maintaining a competitive pool of contractors, 
specifically for ports that are higher risk or less profitable for the contractors. For example, 
assuming no proposals were received on an RTOP for a specific port because commercial 
industry offered a greater profit to all potential contractors on the MAC, the Navy would 
be forced to unilaterally issue a task order to one of those contractors. As a result, the 
selected contractor would be obligated to satisfy the requirements under less preferable 
conditions, otherwise the contractor would have submitted a proposal. This phenomenon 
may create a situation where the contractor is forced to balance quality with the ability to 
fully satisfy the needs of the task order. This theory suggests that the quality of the services 
provided by the contractors could be lower for ports that have less competition because 
they present greater risk or less profitability to the contractor. Therefore, the introduction 
of an on-ramping and off-ramping tool further warrants a need for measuring the effects 
on price by periodically altering the number of contractors. 
3. Recommendation #3. Measure Non-price Factors 
We recommend that contracting personnel managing the HSP program develop a 
system to measure qualitative data to capture changes to non-price factors in the MAC over 
the length of the contract. The findings of this study have shown that MACs have a 
measurable advantage over SACs when evaluating these contract types based entirely on 
price. However, this study is not a comprehensive comparison, and there are non-price 
factors that are relevant for determining the overall value of the MAC effect. Therefore, a 
new benchmark to measure the performance of the MAC over time for both price and non-
price factors is required. We recommend that NAVSUP and interested parties develop a 
policy to measure and translate non-price factors into a standardized quantitative measure, 
enabling analysis of the changes in value of the MAC over time. Therefore, we need quality 
data to be measurable and standardized if we want to assess the overall net benefit of the 
MAC over time.  
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B. CONCLUSION 
Our contributions in the fields of contracting and federal acquisitions for the HSP 
program approached a limit based on the accuracy and availability of data. The comparison 
of SAC and MAC will continue to be an issue that the Navy will face outside of the HSP 
domain, and this study provides a strong foundation for other organizations to reference 
that are currently using SAC IDIQs and want to consider implementing MACs. Our 
findings could be a valuable data point for making a case to implement a greater number 
of MACs across all branches of service and expanding the scale of the current MACs, 
similar to the HSP global MAC. The global MAC will reduce the number of HSP contracts 
awarded across the regions, centralize the contract administration through one procurement 
contracting office, and offer on-ramping and off-ramping opportunities to expand or shrink 
the pool of contractors as necessary.  
Based on our findings, we recommend the Navy implement the MAC strategy on a 
global scale in order to decrease overall HSP contract prices. However, although a global 
MAC is recommended to reduce overall HSP prices, this approach might not be the best 
value or least cost to the government for all ports or situations, as evidenced by the results 
from Model 2. Further research could be done to investigating the possibility of utilizing 
MAC-SAC hybrid HSP contracts for ports that showed positive coefficients for the MAC. 
A SAC-MAC hybrid would likely increase administrative workload but also allow 
contracting offices to issue task orders from whichever contract vehicle, either SAC or 
MAC, offered the lowest prices based on the market conditions.   
With the emerging global MAC, we see a need for greater accuracy of data 
collection, measuring the effects of competition on price with on-ramping and off-ramping, 
and formalizing measurement of non-price factors. Further research could use our model 
to study the effects of the global MAC on price and incorporate additional non-price factors 
to determine the overall benefit for the Navy.  
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APPENDIX.  MODEL 2 RESULTS USING PREFERRED METHOD 
Regression results  
   Coefficient.  St.Err. t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
Abidjan 0.000 . . . . .  
Abu Dhabi 0.040 0.266 0.15 0.880 -0.480 0.561  
Acajutla 0.000 . . . . .  
Agair  0.000 . . . . .  
Agigea  0.000 . . . . .  
Aksaz  -2.591 0.392 -6.60 0.000 -3.361 -1.822 *** 
Al Duqm  -0.747 0.083 -8.96 0.000 -0.911 -0.584 *** 
Alexandria  -1.581 0.294 -5.38 0.000 -2.158 -1.004 *** 
Algiers  0.000 . . . . .  
Amsterdam  0.000 . . . . .  
Anchorage AK  0.000 . . . . .  
Annapolis MD  -0.291 0.404 -0.72 0.471 -1.083 0.500  
Aqaba (Port of 
Aqaba)  
-0.402 0.194 -2.06 0.039 -0.783 -0.020 ** 
Ashdod  0.000 . . . . .  
Astakos  0.000 . . . . .  
Astoria OR  0.135 0.306 0.44 0.659 -0.464 0.734  
Auckland  0.000 . . . . .  
Augusta Bay  -1.193 0.109 -10.91 0.000 -1.407 -0.979 *** 
Balboa  0.000 . . . . .  
Bali  0.000 . . . . .  
Baltimore MD  0.463 0.286 1.62 0.105 -0.097 1.024  
Bar  0.000 . . . . .  
Barbers Point HI  0.000 . . . . .  
Barcelona  0.000 . . . . .  
Batumi  0.000 . . . . .  
Belfast  0.000 . . . . .  
Bengkulu  0.000 . . . . .  
Betio  0.000 . . . . .  
Bitung  0.000 . . . . .  
Bodoe  0.000 . . . . .  
Boston MA  0.000 . . . . .  
Bourgas  0.000 . . . . .  
Brest  -0.327 0.437 -0.75 0.454 -1.184 0.530  
Bridgetown  0.000 . . . . .  
Brindisi  0.000 . . . . .  
Brisbane  0.032 0.137 0.23 0.816 -0.236 0.299  
Bristol  0.000 . . . . .  
Bristol RI  0.000 . . . . .  
Bronx, NYC 
(Kings Point), NY  
0.000 . . . . .  
Bronx, NYC 
(SUNY), NY  
0.388 0.680 0.57 0.568 -0.944 1.720  
Brooklyn, NYC, 
NY  
0.000 . . . . .  
Buffalo NY  0.000 . . . . .  
Cabo San Lucas  0.000 . . . . .  
Cagliari  0.000 . . . . .  
Cairns  -0.237 0.342 -0.69 0.488 -0.908 0.433  
Callao  -1.260 0.299 -4.21 0.000 -1.846 -0.674 *** 
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Cam Ranh Bay  0.000 . . . . .  
Cape Canaveral FL  0.000 . . . . .  
Cartagena  -0.790 0.288 -2.75 0.006 -1.354 -0.226 *** 
Catania  0.000 . . . . .  
Cebu  0.000 . . . . .  
Changi Naval Base  0.000 . . . . .  
Charleston SC  -0.755 0.335 -2.25 0.024 -1.411 -0.099 ** 
Chennai  0.000 . . . . .  
Cherbourg  0.000 . . . . .  
Chinhae  -0.496 0.088 -5.66 0.000 -0.668 -0.324 *** 
Chuuk  0.000 . . . . .  
Civitavecchia  0.000 . . . . .  
Cleveland OH  0.000 . . . . .  
Colombo  0.059 0.256 0.23 0.819 -0.443 0.560  
Colon  -0.472 0.454 -1.04 0.298 -1.362 0.418  
Constanza  -0.591 0.254 -2.33 0.020 -1.088 -0.095 ** 
Copenhagen  0.000 . . . . .  
Corfu  0.000 . . . . .  
Cork  -0.959 0.423 -2.27 0.023 -1.788 -0.130 ** 
Cristobal  0.200 0.293 0.68 0.495 -0.375 0.775  
Crombie  0.000 . . . . .  
Da Nang  0.000 . . . . .  
Dakar  0.000 . . . . .  
Danish Straits  0.000 . . . . .  
Dardanelles - 
Bosporus  
-5.783 0.704 -8.22 0.000 -7.162 -4.403 *** 
Darwin  -0.026 0.197 -0.13 0.893 -0.413 0.360  
Davao  0.000 . . . . .  
Detroit MI  0.000 . . . . .  
Dili  -0.937 0.448 -2.09 0.037 -1.815 -0.058 ** 
Djibouti  -0.230 0.049 -4.69 0.000 -0.326 -0.134 *** 
Doha  0.057 0.131 0.43 0.666 -0.200 0.314  
Donghae  0.000 . . . . .  
Dover  0.000 . . . . .  
Dubai  -0.509 0.492 -1.04 0.300 -1.473 0.454  
Dubrovnik  0.000 . . . . .  
Durres  0.000 . . . . .  
Eastport ME  0.000 . . . . .  
Eckenforde  0.000 . . . . .  
Eilat  -0.341 0.308 -1.11 0.268 -0.944 0.262  
Ensenada  0.000 . . . . .  
Esmeraldas  0.000 . . . . .  
Esquimalt  0.000 . . . . .  
Faslane  -0.889 0.170 -5.23 0.000 -1.222 -0.556 *** 
Ferrol  0.000 . . . . .  
Fort-de-France  0.000 . . . . .  
Freeport  0.000 . . . . .  
Fujairah  1.110 0.060 18.43 0.000 0.992 1.228 *** 
Funafuti  0.000 . . . . .  
Funchal  0.257 0.331 0.78 0.438 -0.392 0.906  
Gaeta  0.351 0.305 1.15 0.250 -0.247 0.949  
Gdynia  0.000 . . . . .  
Georgetown  -0.048 0.454 -0.10 0.916 -0.937 0.842  
Gibraltar  0.000 . . . . .  
Gladstone  0.000 . . . . .  
Glasgow  0.000 . . . . .  
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Goa  0.000 . . . . .  
Greenock  -4.651 0.680 -6.84 0.000 -5.983 -3.319 *** 
Gulfport MS  -0.978 0.316 -3.10 0.002 -1.597 -0.359 *** 
Gwangyang  0.000 . . . . .  
Haakensvern  -0.963 0.240 -4.01 0.000 -1.434 -0.492 *** 
Haifa  0.000 . . . . .  
Hakodate  0.000 . . . . .  
Halifax  0.000 . . . . .  
Hamad Port  0.000 . . . . .  
Hambantota  0.000 . . . . .  
Harstad  0.000 . . . . .  
Helsinki  0.000 . . . . .  
Heraklion  0.000 . . . . .  
Homer AK  0.000 . . . . .  
Hong Kong  0.120 0.158 0.76 0.445 -0.188 0.429  
Honiara  0.014 0.362 0.04 0.969 -0.694 0.723  
Honolulu HI  0.000 . . . . .  
Inverness  0.000 . . . . .  
Ishikariwan Bay 
New Port  
0.000 . . . . .  
Istanbul  0.000 . . . . .  
Iwakuni  0.000 . . . . .  
Izmir  0.000 . . . . .  
Jacksonville FL  -0.812 0.300 -2.71 0.007 -1.401 -0.224 *** 
Jakarta  0.000 . . . . .  
Jebel Ali  0.470 0.041 11.45 0.000 0.390 0.551 *** 
Jeddah  -0.889 0.430 -2.07 0.039 -1.733 -0.046 ** 
Jeju (Cheju)  -0.120 0.228 -0.53 0.598 -0.566 0.326  
Jubail (Commercial 
Port)  
0.000 . . . . .  
Juneau AK  0.000 . . . . .  
Karachi  0.000 . . . . .  
Ketchikan AK  0.000 . . . . .  
Key West FL  -1.558 0.240 -6.48 0.000 -2.029 -1.087 *** 
Khalifa Bin Salman 
Port  
-0.075 0.042 -1.77 0.077 -0.158 0.008 * 
Kiel  0.000 . . . . .  
Klaipeda  0.000 . . . . .  
Koper  0.000 . . . . .  
Koror  0.000 . . . . .  
Kota Kinabalu  0.000 . . . . .  
Kuantan  0.000 . . . . .  
Kuching  0.000 . . . . .  
La Spezia  0.000 . . . . .  
Laboe  0.000 . . . . .  
Laem Chabang  0.000 . . . . .  
Lagos  0.000 . . . . .  
Lahaina HI  0.000 . . . . .  
Langkawi  0.000 . . . . .  
Larnaca  -1.380 0.258 -5.36 0.000 -1.885 -0.875 *** 
Libreville  0.000 . . . . .  
Limassol  0.000 . . . . .  
Lisbon  -0.755 0.261 -2.89 0.004 -1.267 -0.243 *** 
Livorno  0.000 . . . . .  
Lochstriven  0.000 . . . . .  
Long Beach CA  -0.453 1.359 -0.33 0.739 -3.117 2.212  
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Los Angeles CA  -0.026 0.304 -0.09 0.932 -0.622 0.570  
Lumut Naval Base  0.000 . . . . .  
Maizuru  0.000 . . . . .  
Majuro  0.000 . . . . .  
Makassar  0.000 . . . . .  
Malaga  -0.834 0.291 -2.86 0.004 -1.405 -0.263 *** 
Malakal  0.000 . . . . .  
Malibu  0.000 . . . . .  
Man Of War  0.000 . . . . .  
Manhattan, NYC, 
NY  
0.000 . . . . .  
Manila  -0.269 0.125 -2.15 0.032 -0.514 -0.023 ** 
Manta  0.000 . . . . .  
Manzanillo  -1.180 0.174 -6.80 0.000 -1.520 -0.840 *** 
Marmaris  0.000 . . . . .  
Marseille  0.000 . . . . .  
Masan  0.000 . . . . .  
Maura  -0.203 0.257 -0.79 0.430 -0.706 0.301  
Mazatlan  0.000 . . . . .  
Mesaieed  -0.496 0.338 -1.47 0.143 -1.159 0.167  
Miami FL  0.000 . . . . .  
Mina Salman  -0.081 0.077 -1.05 0.293 -0.232 0.070  
Mindelo  0.000 . . . . .  
Mobile AL  -0.831 0.299 -2.78 0.006 -1.417 -0.244 *** 
Mohammed Al 
Ahmad Naval Base 
(Ras Al ..  
2.907 0.551 5.28 0.000 1.828 3.987 *** 
Mokpo  0.000 . . . . .  
Montego Bay  0.000 . . . . .  
Montevideo  0.000 . . . . .  
Montreal  -1.405 0.312 -4.51 0.000 -2.016 -0.794 *** 
Morehead City NC  -1.173 0.148 -7.91 0.000 -1.464 -0.882 *** 
Muara  0.000 . . . . .  
Muscat (Port 
Sultan Qaboos)  
0.605 0.105 5.76 0.000 0.399 0.810 *** 
Muscat (Port of 
Muscat)  




0.000 . . . . .  
Napoli (Naples)  -6.045 1.177 -5.13 0.000 -8.352 -3.737 *** 
Narvik  0.000 . . . . .  
Nassau  -0.956 0.364 -2.63 0.009 -1.669 -0.243 *** 
New London CT  0.000 . . . . .  
New Orleans LA  0.000 . . . . .  
Newport RI  -1.721 0.415 -4.15 0.000 -2.533 -0.908 *** 
Nha Trang  0.000 . . . . .  
Niigata  0.000 . . . . .  
Norfolk VA  -0.567 0.451 -1.25 0.209 -1.452 0.318  
Noumea  0.000 . . . . .  
Nuku Alofa  0.000 . . . . .  
Oakland CA  0.000 . . . . .  
Ocho Rios  0.000 . . . . .  
Odessa  0.000 . . . . .  
Ominato  0.430 0.357 1.21 0.228 -0.270 1.129  
Orkanger  0.000 . . . . .  
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Oslo  0.000 . . . . .  
Otaru  0.256 0.347 0.74 0.462 -0.425 0.936  
Pago-Pago  0.000 . . . . .  
Palma de Mallorca  0.000 . . . . .  
Panama Canal 
Transit  
-0.495 0.229 -2.16 0.031 -0.944 -0.045 ** 
Pascagoula MS  0.000 . . . . .  
Penang  0.000 . . . . .  
Pensacola FL  -3.157 0.680 -4.64 0.000 -4.490 -1.825 *** 
Philadelphia PA  0.000 . . . . .  
Philipsburg  0.000 . . . . .  
Phuket  0.000 . . . . .  
Piata  0.000 . . . . .  
Piraeus  -0.448 0.124 -3.61 0.000 -0.692 -0.205 *** 
Plymouth  -5.550 0.739 -7.51 0.000 -7.000 -4.101 *** 
Pohang  0.000 . . . . .  
Pohnpei  0.739 0.555 1.33 0.183 -0.349 1.827  
Pointe-a-Pitre  0.000 . . . . .  
Ponce  0.000 . . . . .  
Ponta Delgada  0.000 . . . . .  
Port Alucroix  0.000 . . . . .  
Port Canaveral FL  -1.952 0.407 -4.80 0.000 -2.750 -1.155 *** 
Port Everglades FL  -0.245 0.458 -0.54 0.593 -1.142 0.652  
Port Klang  0.000 . . . . .  
Port Lahat Datu  0.000 . . . . .  
Port Moresby  -0.285 1.359 -0.21 0.834 -2.949 2.380  
Port Victoria  -0.677 0.240 -2.83 0.005 -1.147 -0.207 *** 
Port of Spain  0.000 . . . . .  
Portland  0.000 . . . . .  
Portland OR  -0.604 0.365 -1.66 0.098 -1.320 0.111 * 
Portsmouth  0.000 . . . . .  
Portsmouth NH  -1.328 0.653 -2.03 0.042 -2.608 -0.048 ** 
Poti  0.000 . . . . .  
Puerto Barrios  0.000 . . . . .  
Puerto Castilla  -2.038 0.608 -3.35 0.001 -3.231 -0.846 *** 
Puerto Cortes  0.000 . . . . .  
Puerto Princesa  0.134 0.353 0.38 0.704 -0.558 0.826  
Puerto Quetzal  0.000 . . . . .  
Puerto Vallarta  0.000 . . . . .  
Pusan (Busan)  -0.508 0.121 -4.19 0.000 -0.746 -0.271 *** 
Pyeongtaek  0.000 . . . . .  
Rabaul  0.000 . . . . .  
Reykjavik  0.000 . . . . .  
Rhodes  0.000 . . . . .  
Riga  0.000 . . . . .  
Rijeka  0.000 . . . . .  
Rio de Janeiro  0.000 . . . . .  
Riohacha  0.000 . . . . .  
Roatan  0.000 . . . . .  
Rockland ME  0.000 . . . . .  
Rodman  -0.936 0.173 -5.40 0.000 -1.275 -0.596 *** 
Ronne  0.000 . . . . .  
Rostock  0.000 . . . . .  
Rotterdam  0.000 . . . . .  
Royal Jordanian 
Naval Base, Aqaba  
0.000 . . . . .  
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Safaga  -2.031 0.341 -5.96 0.000 -2.699 -1.363 *** 
Saipan  0.759 0.184 4.13 0.000 0.399 1.119 *** 
Salalah  0.338 0.096 3.52 0.000 0.149 0.526 *** 
Salamis  0.000 . . . . .  
Salvador  0.000 . . . . .  
San Diego CA  0.565 0.240 2.35 0.019 0.094 1.036 ** 
San Fernando  0.000 . . . . .  
San Francisco CA  0.000 . . . . .  
San Juan  -0.886 0.384 -2.31 0.021 -1.639 -0.133 ** 
Santa Marta  0.169 0.710 0.24 0.812 -1.222 1.561  
Santo Domingo  0.000 . . . . .  
Santorini  0.000 . . . . .  
Sasebo  -0.701 0.080 -8.73 0.000 -0.858 -0.543 *** 
Sattahip  0.000 . . . . .  
Seattle WA  0.836 0.198 4.22 0.000 0.448 1.225 *** 
Sekondi  0.000 . . . . .  
Sembawang  0.000 . . . . .  
Sepangar  0.000 . . . . .  
Setubal  0.000 . . . . .  
Seward AK  0.000 . . . . .  
Shimoda  -0.114 0.416 -0.28 0.783 -0.930 0.701  
Shuaiba  0.000 . . . . .  
Sihanoukville  0.000 . . . . .  
Singapore  0.354 0.527 0.67 0.501 -0.678 1.387  
Sitra  -0.681 0.511 -1.33 0.183 -1.682 0.321  
Souda Bay  -0.431 0.306 -1.41 0.158 -1.030 0.168  
Spillum  0.000 . . . . .  
Split  0.000 . . . . .  
Sriracha  0.000 . . . . .  
St. John's  0.000 . . . . .  
St. Thomas  -0.410 0.502 -0.82 0.414 -1.394 0.574  
Staten Island, NY  0.000 . . . . .  
Staten Island, 
NYC, NY  
0.000 . . . . .  
Stirling  0.000 . . . . .  
Stockholm  0.000 . . . . .  
Stornoway  0.000 . . . . .  
Suape  0.000 . . . . .  
Subic Bay  0.000 . . . . .  
Surbaya (Port of 
Surabaya)  
0.000 . . . . .  
Suva  -0.875 0.361 -2.42 0.015 -1.583 -0.167 ** 
Svendborg  0.000 . . . . .  
Swinoujscie  0.000 . . . . .  
Sydney  0.000 . . . . .  
Syros  0.000 . . . . .  
Talcahuano  0.000 . . . . .  
Tallinn  0.000 . . . . .  
Tanger (Tangier)  0.000 . . . . .  
Tanung Wangi  0.000 . . . . .  
Taranto  0.000 . . . . .  
Tawau  0.000 . . . . .  
Tema  0.000 . . . . .  
Theoule-Sur-Mer  0.000 . . . . .  
Thessaloniki  0.000 . . . . .  
Thilawa  0.000 . . . . .  
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Tokyo  0.000 . . . . .  
Toulon  -0.248 0.345 -0.72 0.472 -0.925 0.428  
Townsville  0.124 0.179 0.69 0.491 -0.228 0.475  
Trieste  0.000 . . . . .  
Trincomalee  -0.399 0.653 -0.61 0.541 -1.679 0.881  
Tromso  -0.518 0.275 -1.89 0.060 -1.058 0.021 * 
Trondheim  0.000 . . . . .  
Tunis  0.000 . . . . .  
Turbo  0.000 . . . . .  
Valencia  0.000 . . . . .  
Valletta  0.000 . . . . .  
Valparaiso  -1.137 0.315 -3.61 0.000 -1.754 -0.520 *** 
Vancouver  0.000 . . . . .  
Varna  0.000 . . . . .  
Venice  0.000 . . . . .  
Villerfranche  0.000 . . . . .  
Visakhapatnam  0.000 . . . . .  
Volos  0.000 . . . . .  
Welland  0.000 . . . . .  
White Beach 
Okinawa  
0.000 . . . . .  
Wilhelmshaven  0.000 . . . . .  
Willemstad  0.000 . . . . .  
Wudam Naval 
Base  
0.000 . . . . .  
Yap  0.000 . . . . .  
Yeosu  0.000 . . . . .  
Yokosuka  -0.781 0.126 -6.20 0.000 -1.027 -0.534 *** 
Zeebrugge  0.000 . . . . .  
 logqty -0.354 0.007 -47.37 0.000 -0.369 -0.339 *** 
 exchange -0.004 0.002 -1.76 0.078 -0.009 0.000 * 
 Constant 6.016 0.290 20.76 0.000 5.448 6.584 *** 
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